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This dissertation was written as part of the MA in the Classical Archaeology and Ancient 
History of Macedonia at the International Hellenic University.  
This dissertation details the life and actions of Amyntas III, king of Macedonia and father 
of Philip II. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the various historical perspectives concerning 
this underappreciated historical figure. These modern interpretations are substantiated by the 
ancient writings of the Greek historians. These include but are not limited to: Justin, Diodorus 
Siculus, Aeschines, Xenophon, and Isocrates. The historiographical analysis of the relevant 
modern sources are highlighted by a detailed description of the works of NGL Hammond, Robert 
Lane Fox, Eugene Borza, and CJ King. These monographs are supported by a collection of 
secondary sources found from a collection of historical and archaeological journals. 
The second part of this dissertation deals with the available epigraphic and numismatic 
sources associated with Amyntas III. Particular topics of interest include the identification and 
observation of the extant remains of royal treaties and coins minted with the emblems of the 
Temenid royal house. 
The third and final section of the dissertation provides a narrative based analysis of the 
reign of Amyntas III. This process is prefaced by a look into the nature of the Macedonian royal 
succession, a process thrown into chaos by the unexpected murder of the Macedonian king 
Archelaus. This section will be followed by an observation of Amyntas’ family and how he dealt 
with the Illyrian threat of 393 BC. The final two sections of this narrative will detail Amyntas’ 
dynamic and often volatile relations with both the Chalcidians and Athenians. 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ioannis Xydopoulos for his support and 
encouragement during this difficult process. Your support has made this dissertation possible. I 
would also like to thank the staff of the International Hellenic University for their openness and 
acceptance throughout my stay in Greece. You really made Greece a home away from home. 
Finally, I would like to thank all my friends and classmates who helped me adapt to the Greek 
way of life during my one year stay in the country. 









The inspiration for choosing Amyntas III as the topic of this dissertation originated in a 
lecture concerning the Macedonian anarchy, (399-393 BC) taught during my second semester at 
the International Hellenic University. The lack of information concerning the royal predecessors 
of Philip II stood in stark contrast to the wealth of information provided by scholars interested in 
the study of Alexander III. This dearth of scholarly discourse provided a unique opportunity to 
provide an original take on a relatively overlooked period of ancient history. This chance to 
provide a new insight into the burgeoning historical discourse made the subject an appealing 
scholarly prospect. 
Research into the subject of Amyntas III was initially difficult. The ancient sources were 
limited to the biased accounts of the southern Greeks. The sources were similarly vague in their 
description of Amyntas III. This meant that a direct reading of the ancient source material was 
not possible. To combat this a contextual reading of the ancient material was employed. This 
allowed for a relatively objective analysis of the events of Amyntas’ reign. 
The modern sources were similarly vague in their description of Amyntas III, as they chose 
to focus on the exploits of Philip II and his son, Alexander the Great. Any reference to Amyntas 
was circumstantial in scope and limited in its interpretation. To combat this, a comprehensive 
analysis of all the available source material was employed. This included monographs, scholarly 
journals, and epigraphic accounts. These sources were similarly read for context, not direct 
interpretation. This allowed for a detailed analysis of Amyntas’ literary record.  
The research process involved the longest duration of direct attention. Sources were 
collected and interpreted over a period of six months, to provide the most comprehensive view 
possible. The writing process was similarly substantial, stretching from November of 2020 to 
January of 2021. While difficult, the process can definitely be viewed as productive and 
rewarding. It is my hope that the finished product is similarly informative for future academics 
interested in the study of Macedonia’s forgotten monarch. Ultimately, the goal of this 
dissertation is to encourage further interest into this overlooked period of Macedonian history 
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 The following dissertation examines the figure of Amyntas III. Often overlooked in 
historical works by the exploits of his successors, Amyntas represents a sort of historical enigma, 
a figure understood through association and conjecture, not historical fact. The scholarly 
understanding of Amyntas III is further challenged by the overt bias of the ancient source 
material. This bias is witnessed in the historical misinterpretation and overt slander of Amyntas 
III. The modern scholars are similarly impaired in their understanding of Amyntas III, as they 
mention the king in passing or in association with his better known successors. To combat the 
inherent weaknesses of the source material a contextual view of the sources will be employed. 
 The dissertation will commence with a detailed analysis of the modern source material. 
The monographs detailed in this section are the primary sources of encyclopedic knowledge 
concerning Ancient Macedonia. The analysed sources are:  N.G.L Hammond and  G.T Griffith’s A 
History of Macedonia: Volume Two, Eugene N Borza’s In the Shadow of Olympus: the Emergence 
of Macedon, Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington’s  A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, and 
Robert Lane Fox’s Companion to Ancient Macedonia. These works will be compared with the 
perspectives of the ancient authors. The goal of this section is to establish a primary 
understanding of Amyntas’ presence in the literary works of the period. 
 The second section involves an analysis of the supplementary sources associated with 
Amyntas III. Epigraphic analysis and numismatic interpretations will be provided in this section. 
For the epigraphic analysis, the treaty between Amyntas III and the Chalcidian league will be 
observed. For the numismatic evidence, silver coinage from the period will be interpreted. The 
goal of this section is to evaluate Amyntas’ presence in history outside of the written record as it 
lacks the intrinsic biases of the written word. These conclusions will be useful in the crafting of 
an objective historical narrative. 
 The third and final section of the dissertation is a narrative account of Amyntas’ rule over 
the kingdom of Macedonia. The first chapter covers the intervening years between the death of 
Archelaus and the ascendency of Amyntas III. It is followed by a discussion of the Macedonian 
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royal succession and Amyntas’ initial years as king of Macedon. The section is concluded by two 
chapters, which detail Amyntas’ dynamic relationships with Olynthus and Athens respectively.  
 The goal of this historical investigation is quite straightforward. It is meant to bring a fresh 
new perspective to the relatively barren historical discourse. Ultimately, it is meant to encourage 
further scholarly interest In Macedonia’s lesser known kings, who hold greater historical 




















Chapter 1: Amyntas III in the Modern Sources: the Primary Literary Material 
 
 The historiographical study of Amyntas III presents the prospective scholar with a 
historical conundrum. He ascended to the throne in a period characterized by a weakness of 
central authority. This dynastic instability was brought upon by: rampant amphimetric strife, 
regicide, foreign influence in Macedonian affairs, Illyrian raids, and Olynthian expansion. In the 
face of such adversity, logic dictates that Amyntas’ ability to hold the declining kingdom together 
would have aroused the interest of his historical contemporaries. Instead, the king remained a 
relative enigma, an overlooked historical footnote eclipsed by the exceptional reigns of his son, 
Philip II and grandson Alexander III. Relegated to the background of historical interest, Amyntas 
is only mentioned in passing, with the often identified in history as either the “father of Philip II” 
or the “husband of Eurydice”.   However, his relative anonymity should not be viewed as an 
excuse to label him as historically insignificant, as this assessment could not be farther from the 
truth. Instead, in the interest of providing a comprehensive and detailed analysis, the modern 
historiography must be consulted. These viewpoints, while subject to the weakness of the source 
material and bias of the period in which they are written, are more cordial in their representation 
of Amyntas, aptly identifying him as the “founder of the unified Macedonian state”1 The apparent 
willingness to go beyond the implicit ethnocentricity of historical writing will serve this 
investigation well, as it will allow for a more honest representation of an often misunderstood 
dynasty. 
  Unfortunately, the quality of the scholarship on Amyntas III is subject to the same 
limitations which plague all Macedonian history pre-Alexander. These scholarly shortcomings, 
while not at all the fault of the modern historian, are easily identifiable by those wishing to study 
Macedonian history. As such, the available source material concerning ancient Macedonian 
history can be criticized for its generality, brevity, and rarity. The absence of source material, 
while initially puzzling, can also be easily understood when one recognizes the influence of bias 
on the crafting and dissemination of information. A significant lack of interest in Macedonia, likely 
                                                          




a result of deep set ethnocentric bias, contributed to a state of scholarly stagnation. It is also 
important to recognize that while the shortcomings of the historical record are partly caused by 
a lack of domestic representation, the decision to effectively treat Macedonia as a historical 
“outsider” is not completely the product of poor historical preservation, with the exploits of the 
ancient Macedonian kings lost to the ravages of time.  Instead, Macedonia’s omission from the 
greater Greek narrative seems to be an extension of contemporary Greek prejudices, centered 
on the dichotomy of civility and barbarism. Therefore, the politics of ancient Macedonia, while 
occasionally mentioned when their actions affected the affairs of civilized Greece, were often 
ignored. This does not mean that the Greeks completely omitted the actions of the Macedonians 
from their historical record. Rather, it is safe to assume that historical apathy, combined with the 
ethnocentric prejudices of ancient Greeks fostered an often indifferent or hostile representation 
of Macedonia. Conflicting political interests, combined with a spirit of competition over the 
valuable resources of Macedonia fostered a dynamic and often volatile relationship between 
Macedonia and the Greek south. As such, the record is equally dynamic, changing on the basis of 
Macedon’s relationship with the premier Greek powers of the day. Therefore, the goal of the 
historian, when dealing with the study of ancient Macedonia, is to contextualize the bias of 
ancient material, to work through its implicit shortcomings, all the while formulating an explicit 
narrative which is easily digestible for academic purposes. To this end, modern historians have 
done a commendable job, as a wealth of newly crafted material has been added to the 
burgeoning historical discourse. 
 In the effort of contextualizing an incomplete and often misunderstood period of 
Macedonian history, such as the rule of Amyntas III, it is vital to concentrate the focus of the 
investigation on the man himself. The construction of a comprehensive narrative account of the 
life and actions of Amyntas III are made all the more difficult by the aforementioned scholarly 
biases in the contemporary literature. Therefore, all avenues of historical study must be 
consulted to: achieve a comprehensive description of the man in question, to understand the 
positions of Amyntas’ literary peers, and finally to provide new historical insight in the hopes of 
encouraging further historical debate on the topic.  
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  To properly facilitate this difficult task, the description and analysis of Amyntas III in 
modern sources will be divided into a tripartite form of investigation. Information on Amyntas III 
will be categorized in one of three distinct forms of historiography. These categories are as 
follows: the literary record, epigraphical accounts, and numismatic representations. The literary 
category is the most expansive as it covers the description and analysis of Amyntas in all forms 
of literary history. This broad categorization includes but is not limited to: monographs, scholarly 
articles, and modern translations of the ancient authors. To further ease the comprehension of 
Amyntas’ presence in the historical narrative, two chapters will be dedicated to the topic. The 
first chapter covers Amyntas’ presence in what is considered the primary sources concerning 
ancient Macedonia. This source analysis will conclude with a comparison of how these authors 
interpreted the overall reign of Amyntas III. The second chapter will deal with the supplementary 
source material, mainly through the detailing of the available epigraphic evidence concerning 
Amyntas III. This will be followed by a brief analysis of the numismatic representation of Amyntas 
III. These sources are few in number but are vital to the understanding of Amyntas’ reign due to 
the lack of substantial primary source material. Therefore, their historiographical value 
necessitates their inclusion.  
Amyntas III in the Modern Literature 
 
 As the goal of this historical investigation is to provide a comprehensive narrative account 
of Amyntas’ life, it is paramount that the investigation commence with a general consultation of 
the more encyclopedic modern source material: namely the general histories. These sources are 
broad, covering a variety of topics while maintaining a singular narrative focus. While limited in 
their capacity to provide specific insight, general histories are vital to the understanding of 
Amyntas III as they provide a simplistic means of contextualizing the period before the ascension 
of Amyntas, the highlights of his rule, and the effects of his decisions following his death.   
The first of these encyclopedic monographs is Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedonia. 
Edited by Robert J. Lane Fox, the text acts as a compilation of scholarly topics by each of the 
specialists working in the field of Macedonian history and archaeology. The particular chapter of 
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interest for this historical investigation is written by Lane Fox himself and is appropriately titled 
by the period of history it covers: 399-393 BC. Lane Fox begins his narrative by highlighting the 
primary issue concerning the study of ancient Macedonia, namely that “Sources for the period 
remain patchy and fragmentary”2 He credits the efforts of scholars who came before him, 
highlighting their ability to establish a rudimentary historical narrative amongst the scattered 
remnants of the ancient source material. A particular point of interest lies in his praise of 
Hammond’s work, which he identifies as foundational to the study of the period. This is 
contrasted by his treatment of Borza who he simply credits with following upon the foundational 
works of Hammond and Griffith.3 Lane Fox recognizes the intrinsic weaknesses of these 
foundational works by highlighting the issues faced by scholars consulting the contemporary 
evidence. These include the employment of emendations4, the crafting of hypothetical 
genealogies, the use of repetitive narratives, and finally the divergent uses of Diodorus’ ancient 
dating methods.5 
Amyntas III is first mentioned by Lane Fox in his discussion surrounding the often violent 
chain of succession in Macedonia during the period following the assassination of Archelaus. 
Amyntas is recognized as an exception to the rule of amphimetric strife and regicide, which had 
plagued the reigns of his predecessors. He reigns on the throne of Macedonia for a period of 
twenty four years and dies peacefully without incident.6 Lane Fox begins his analysis of Amyntas 
by highlighting a historical debate founded on the parentage of Amyntas. He lends equal 
plausibility to both sides of the debate. However, he also recognizes that the association of 
Amyntas III as the bastard son of Menelaus is purely slanderous in comparison to the rather 
mundane link between Amyntas and a figure simply named Arrhidaeus found in epigraphic 
accounts.7 The belief that Amyntas fabricated the figure of Arrhidaeus seems sound as it follows 
the precedent set by his royal predecessor Archelaus. However, it is also equally as likely that the 
                                                          
2 Lane Fox 2011, p. 210 
3 Lane Fox 2011, p. 210-211 
4 Merriam Webster defines the phrase as an alteration designed to correct or improve. In this case Lane Fox refers 
to the modification of the chronological sequence during the period of 393-360 BC. See: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/emendation 
5 Lane Fox 2011, p. 211  
6 Lane Fox 2011, p. 219 
7 Lane Fox 2011, p. 219-220 
Klein 12 
 
literary record linked the parentage of Amyntas III to the bastard Menelaus as a way of supporting 
the insurrection of his royal rivals, namely Argaeus. This in itself is an overt example of 
amphimetric strife, which is manifested in the surviving literature as scandalous fabrications 
levelled at Amyntas in an effort to delegitimize his already precarious hold on power. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the truth lies in a combination of both possibilities.  Therefore, it is 
possible that Amyntas III was labelled as a bastard in the literature to strengthen the claims of 
his rivals. At the same time he created the spectre of Arrhidaeus, an unconnected royal figure 
who was unrelated to the line of Perdiccas II, from which his royal rivals originated. By doing so, 
he emulated the actions of Archelaus, creating a new royal mythos from which he could protect 
the stability of his realm from both internal and external threats. 
Lane Fox continues his text by detailing the events of Amyntas’ reign following his 
usurpation of royal authority. An interesting aspect of his narrative lies in his belief that the 
Illyrian invasion, which led to Amyntas’ brief expulsion in 393 BC, was in fact started and 
encouraged in response to his own usurpation of power from the previous king Pausanias.8 This 
assessment is sound, as a destabilization of royal authority would have followed Amyntas’ 
ascension, allowing for the incursion of Illyrian raiders onto the Macedonian frontier, a region 
which would have been left relatively undefended in a period of internal strife. From this point 
forward, lane Fox generally follows the narrative employed by Hammond and Griffith. He 
highlights two specific initiatives Amyntas undertook at the outset of his reign, which were 
designed to strengthen his fragile grip on royal authority. 
The first of these two initiatives involved his marriage to Eurydice, daughter of Syrrhas, 
whom scholars unabashedly labelled as “thrice barbarian, an Illyrian.”9 Lane Fox’s defence of 
Eurydice in the face of obvious slander is appropriate as the label is once again not based in truth, 
and instead must be viewed as an open critique of her right to rule. This fabrication would have 
originated from both Amyntas III and Eurydice’s royal rivals, another example of amphimethric 
strife, which Daniel Ogden correctly identified as the divisive actions taken by royal rivals to 
                                                          
8 Lane Fox 2011, p. 221 
9 Ibid.  
Klein 13 
 
destabilize, inhibit, and ultimately usurp royal authority.10 This political marriage, between 
Eurydice, a member of the Upper Macedonian Lyncestrid house, and Amyntas III was successful 
in its goals as it secured internal stability by linking the new royal house with the established 
families of Upper Macedonia. This union in effect strengthened the frontiers of Amyntas’ 
kingdom by preventing further incursions by the Illyrians, a fact proven by the lack of Illyrian 
intervention in Macedonian royal affairs until the death of Amyntas III.11 It also brought harmony 
to the kingdom, as the royal union eased tensions between the historically opposed upper 
Macedonian kingdom and the royal court.12 
The second initiative detailed by Lane Fox, involved Amyntas’ signing of a treaty with the 
expansionist power of the Chalcidic league. The details of this treaty will be further elaborated 
on in the following chapter. To briefly summarize its importance one must look at the effects of 
such an agreement. First, the treaty set in writing the creation of a military alliance between 
Macedonia and its eastern neighbour. This defensive alliance would be honoured for fifty years, 
a period Amyntas III likely deemed sufficient to ensure peace for the duration of his reign.13 
Second, the back side of the treaty provided favourable trade arrangements for the Chalcidic 
league. These benefits included the ability to import Macedonian timber and pitch, which were 
vital to the construction of triremes, free of the usual tolls and tariffs traditionally imposed by 
the Macedonians.14 The terms of this treaty seem lopsided upon first glance. However, the terms, 
while generous to Olynthus, did not provide them a free hand in the exploitation of Macedonia’s 
bountiful natural resources.  Instead, it represents the efforts of Olynthus, not Macedonia, to 
                                                          
10 Ogden 1999, p.x Ogden associates these disputes as originating from the various conflicts between mother- and 
children groups. These disputes were quite common but were often limited to slander orchestrated by rival lines of 
the royal family. As such, the phenomenon of amphimetric strife is not possible without the employment of 
polygamy by the Argead kings of Macedonia, which resulted in many secondary wives, and pretenders to the royal 
succession. 
11 Lane Fox 2011, p. 221 
12 Ibid. Note:  Lane Fox mentions that treaties were only “made for life” beginning in the latter 4th century and are 
traditionally associated with the treaties signed by Philip II. This realization highlights both the ceremonial nature of 
treaties and their vulnerability, as they were often broken before their allotted duration ended. 
13 Lane Fox 2011, p. 222 
14 Ibid. Lane Fox mentions the phrase “whatever it asks for” when detailing the amount of silver furs Chalcidice were 
allowed to import free of the traditional fees. This statement conflicts with his later assessment that the treaty did 
not give Chalcidice a free hand in Macedonia’s economically valuable eastern provinces. While initially confusing, his 
interpretation of the treaty is sound as both parties are limited in what they gain from the treaty and do not emerge 
significantly more powerful as a result of its signing.  
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achieve an equitable share of the timber trade in the face of newfound Macedonian strength. 
This is confirmed by Lane Fox’s statement that “Chalcidice feared an alliance of Macedonia, 
Bottiaea, Amphipolis, Acanthus, and Mende.”15 As such, the decision to include an amendment 
preventing the alliance of Macedonia and these powers did not strengthen Chalcidice as they 
were also barred from such actions. Therefore, this initiative represents an effort by Amyntas III 
to secure new allies, not from a position of weakness as initially assumed, but as an equal partner 
in military defence and economic opportunity. 
The final section of Lane Fox’s chapter concerning Amyntas, highlights two key events 
vital to the chronological sequence of Amyntas’ historical narrative. The first of these events 
involved the usurpation of royal authority by a figure simply known to historians as Argaeus. The 
specifics of this event will be covered in a later chapter. Regardless, it is important to highlight a 
few of Lane Fox’s key takeaways concerning the exile of the Macedonian monarch. The first 
conclusion involves the timing of his exile, which Lane Fox placed five years following his initial 
ascension.16 It is interesting to note that he used the same fragmentary source material of 
Diodorus which he criticized previously to reach this conclusion.17 The main takeaways involve 
the ceding of land to the Chalcidice League and the potential return of Illyrian raiders, whose 
presence facilitate both the usurpation of Amyntas III and the desperate exchange of land for 
protection made by the Macedonian monarch. This period is appropriately seen as a period of 
overt crisis. A crisis which was brought about by an overall weakness of central authority in the 
Macedonian state. To combat this overt threat to the stability of his realm Amyntas III employed 
a similar tactic to when he signed the previous treaty with Chalcidice, as he offered economic 
and political incentives to secure military support in a time of crisis. The use of Diodorus as the 
primary source for the period also raises the issue of a potential historical doublet.18  Argaeus, 
                                                          
15 Lane Fox 2011, p. 223 
16 Lane Fox 2011, p. 223  
17 Diodorus Siculus Library 15.19.2 “In Macedonia Amyntas the king had been defeated by the Illyrians and had 
relinquished his authority; he had furthermore made a grant to the people of the Olynthians of a large part of the 
borderland because of his abandonment of political power.” 
18 Lane Fox 2011, p. 224:  Lane Fox recognizes Hammond and Griffith’s reasoning behind the mentioning of two 
Illyrian invasions as many of Diodorus’ doublets were mentioned with some basis of truth to them. However, the 
passage is too similar in structure and outcome to Diodorus’ account of the initial Illyrian incursion (14.91.3). 
Therefore, the passage should be viewed as a summary of previous events instead of a retelling of a separate event. 
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whether he existed or not, was eventually usurped in turn after two years of rule by forces loyal 
to Amyntas.19 The aforementioned grant of land to the Chalcidice League would eventually lead 
to war, with Amyntas III deprived of the majority of his kingdom’s lands. It is only through the 
intervention of Sparta that the rule of Amyntas in Macedonia is restored, ushering in a period of 
peace which would last until the end of his reign.  
The final decade of Amyntas III’s reign is comparatively quiet, a reality made possible 
through the use of shrewd diplomacy. Lane Fox states that he maintained friendly relations with 
the expansionist Jason of Pherae, 20 and secured a seat at the negotiation table for the signing of 
the king’s peace.21 Amyntas’ representative voted in favour of returning Amphipolis to the 
Athenians, an action which seemingly mirrors the short-sighted granting of land given to the 
Chalcidice League in the previous decade. This may be the truth, as the Athenians had been the 
ones to invite a representative of the Macedonians to the peace negotiations, likely with the 
assurance that Amyntas would vote in their favour. However, it is also possible that Amyntas’ 
inclusion at the negotiations signalled Athenian friendship, not overlordship. The complicated 
relationship between the two might be best understood as one of mutual convenience as Athens 
needed Macedonia’s vote and Amyntas needed Athens’s protection. Inclusion at the event was 
also highly prestigious for the Macedonian king, providing legitimacy to his rule, while 
encouraging acceptance of Macedonia’s Hellenization, a process first facilitated by the rule of his 
predecessor Archelaus. 
 The second modern source of particular interest to the study of Amyntas III is Roisman 
and Worthington’s A Companion to Ancient Macedonia. Joseph Roisman contributes the 
particular chapter of interest, which details the period of classical Macedonia up until the rule of 
Perdiccas III. His chapter follows a chronological structure beginning with the ascension of 
                                                          
19 Lane Fox 2011, p. 226 
20 Lane Fox 2011, p. 227 “The treaty between the two powers was most likely a reaction to the grand designs of 
Jason, who had ambitions of controlling lands held by Amyntas III.” 
21 Aeschines Speeches 2.33 “Now,” said I, “a claim which Amyntas renounced in the presence of all the Greeks, and 
that not by words alone, but by his vote, that claim you his son have no right to advance. But if you argue that it is 
right for you to keep the place because you took it in war, if it is true that it was a war against us in which you took 
the city, you do hold it justly, by right of conquest; but if it was from the Amphipolitans that you took a city which 
belonged to the Athenians, it is not the property of the Amphipolitans that you are holding, but territory of Athens.” 
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Amyntas III through the murder of his predecessor Pausanias.22 His narrative is more condensed 
than Lane Fox but provides new insights beyond the detailed narrative of Lane Fox. The first of 
these insights lye in the identification of the Dardanian king Bardylis as the central figure behind 
the Illyrian raid which expelled Amyntas from his land in 393 BC.23 This contribution to the record 
is important as it provides new perspective to the scholarly understanding of the seemingly 
random attack of the Illyrians. The raid is not a random incursion by a disorganized group, but a 
united venture led by the centralized command of the Dardanian king.  
Roisman shares Lane Fox’s frustration with the lack of intact contemporary source 
material and states that a combination of external pressures, from the expansionist powers of 
Illyria and Chalcidice, and internal strife, caused by rampant internal squabbles in the royal court, 
forced Amyntas III to adopt a dynamic foreign policy similar to that of his predecessor Perdiccas 
II, who was often criticized for his “malleable” sense of loyalty.24 Like Perdiccas, Amyntas formed 
an alliance with Sparta, whom he called on for aid during the Chalcidice war following his 
expulsion from Pella. The specifics of this overture are debated by Roisman, who provides three 
unique sources for the outbreak of war between Macedonia and Chalcidice. All three sources 
agree that war broke out as a result of the Chalcidice refusal of the return of Amyntas’ eastern 
territories.25  However, the sources disagree on the catalyst behind Spartan intervention, as 
Isocrates26 and Diodorus Siculus27 credited the envoys of Amyntas for their shrewd diplomacy. In 
contrast, Xenophon identified the appeal of Acanthus and Apollonia, historical rivals of 
Olynthus28 as the primary motivator behind Spartan intervention.29 The truth likely lies as a 
combination of both sources, with the Spartans rallied to action in the interest of halting 
Chalcidice expansion while maintaining its own hegemony. Regardless, the overtures of Amyntas 
                                                          
22 Diodorus Siculus Library 14.89.2  
23 Roisman, Worthington 2010, p. 159  
24 For evidence concerning Perdiccas’ oft changing allegiances see Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 115-136 Hammond 
views these diplomatic moves as reactive in nature, as the survival of Macedonia required amiable relations with 
the majority of Greece as the kingdom lacked both a standing army and loyal allies. 
25 Roisman, Worthington 2010, p. 159 
26 Isocrates Speeches 4.126 
27 Diodorus Siculus Library 15.19.2–3 
28 Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.13  
29 Roisman, Worthington 2010, p. 159 Roisman believes that the envoys of the two Greek cities aimed to scare Sparta 
into action. As such, it is possible that the success of Olynthus may have been exaggerated.   
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achieved its desired effect as the Spartans curtailed Olynthus’ authority through the dissolution 
of their confederacy. 
Amyntas would not stand idle following his restoration, and would openly engage in 
friendly diplomacy with Sparta’s main Greek rival, Athens. The decision to openly antagonise an 
established ally, while dangerous, allowed for a more flexible foreign policy. It prevented the 
domination of Macedonian affairs by any singular Greek power, which in turn prevented a 
monopolization of Macedonia’s valuable natural resources. Therefore, the decision to embrace 
Athens in favour of Sparta was most likely followed on the hope of formulating a mutually 
beneficial diplomatic and economic understanding.  Roisman states that Athenian relations were 
initially strengthened through the adoption of the Athenian general Iphicrates.30 This shrewd 
maneuver hoped to achieve two separate ends. First, Amyntas likely hoped for the guaranteed 
aid of Iphicrates’ forces in times of crisis. This decision seems sound, as the combined protection 
of both Sparta and Athens would dissuade further incursions into Macedonia by Amyntas’ various 
enemies. It is equally likely that Amyntas made this move in the hopes of allying with Cotys, king 
of Thrace.31 Amyntas also actively aimed to foster Athenian economic ventures through the 
support of the private citizen Timotheus as he provided access to Macedonian timber.32 The 
subsidizing of this private enterprise was beneficial to all parties involved as Macedonia gained 
the support of another Athenian general, a key connection which contributed to the signing of 
the alliance between Macedonia and Athens in the late 370’s BC. This treaty reaffirmed 
Macedonia’s position as Athens’s primary timber supplier, a position which guaranteed 
Macedonia’s territorial independence. 
The general histories concerning Amyntas III primarily draw on the foundational work of 
Hammond and Griffith, whose monograph served as the primary modern source when it came 
to the study of ancient Macedonia. While it is later criticized and challenged by later historians, 
                                                          
30 Roisman, Worthington 2010, p. 160 
31 Ibid. 




such as the aforementioned Lane Fox, the work serves as the central piece of scholarship 
necessary to the understanding of Amyntas III. 
Hammond and Griffith’s analysis employs the same chronological method later expanded 
upon by Lane Fox and Roisman. Their interpretations of the various crises of Amyntas’ reign are 
vital to the understanding of Amyntas’ life as they provide context to a period of relative historical 
ignorance. 
 Their narrative, which served as the foundational material for Lane Fox and Roisman’s 
general histories, appropriately followed an almost identical chronological structure: beginning 
with the Illyrian invasion of 393 BC33, continuing with the Macedonian-Chalcidice War34, and 
ending with the strengthening of Macedonian-Athenian relations.35 As such, the summarization 
of Amyntas’ rule, while generalized, is accurate.36 Amyntas’ rule is portrayed as reactive in nature, 
with the Macedonian monarch forced to adapt to the various crises of his weakened kingdom. 
His decisions are determined by the needs of the present, resulting in acts of desperation which 
inadvertently compromise the future security of his realm. This theory is encapsulated in the 
interactions between Macedonia and the Chalcidian league. On two separate occasions 
Hammond states that Amyntas ceded land to the league in the hope of securing military aid 
against the Illyrians. These territories were not explicitly identified by Amyntas, a fact which left 
the specifics of the territorial transaction up to interpretation.37  
 The decision to cede land before obtaining Chalcidice’s agreement to an alliance seems 
politically short-sighted, as it would further the designs of a potential future enemy without the 
guarantee of military support. It would be more prudent to secure the support of a more 
amicable Greek power, one who would not explicitly require the transfer of land for the promise 
of support. Unfortunately, Amyntas lacked such an option, as the majority of the Greek world 
                                                          
33 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 172 
34 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 176-178 
35 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 178-180 
36 Justin 7.4.6 “Cum Illyriis deinde et cum Olynthiis gravia bella gessit ... then he made serious wars against the 
Illyrians and the Olynthians.” 
37 Hammond states that Amyntas “gave to the Olynthians the territory near at hand.” 
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was locked in intermittent bouts of conflict amongst themselves.38 Therefore, the decision of 
Amyntas III is one of circumstance, with the expansionist Olynthus assuming the role of 
Macedonia’s potential saviour by process of elimination. This circumstantial agreement is 
temporary, with the land effectively returned to them through the treaty signed with Chalcidice 
following the restoration of Amyntas III in 391 BC.39 
 Hammond’s is often critiqued in his analysis of Amyntas III for his recognition of Diodorus 
Siculus’ “historical doublet”.40 The doublet in question involved his recognition of two separate 
Illyrian invasions of Macedonia: the Dardanian invasion led by king Bardylis in 393 BC, and the 
Macedonian defeat at the hands of Illyrians in 383 BC. Hammond defended his scholarly faux pas 
on the basis of preventing historical revisionism, a practice he associated with the favouring of 
narrative over truth.41 He begins his defence by identifying the two events as structurally and 
thematically distinct. The first invasion42 involved the expulsion of Amyntas III from Macedonia 
and the subsequent restoration of him to the throne after a period of two years by his allies in 
Thessaly, the Aluedae of Larissa. The second Illyrian incursion43 was limited to an Illyrian victory 
over the Macedonians. This defeat was absolute but did not result in Amyntas’ exile as the 
invasion of 393 BC had. Therefore, through the use of comparative analysis, Hammond crafted 
what he believed to be a clear distinction between the two events. The first invasion resulted in 
the occupation of Macedonia by the Illyrians and the exile of Amyntas III, a status quo which only 
ended with the aid of Amyntas’ Thessalian allies. The second invasion culminated in a disastrous 
defeat for Amyntas on the battlefield. However, this defeat did not result in his expulsion from 
Macedonia as he was able to regain his kingdom in short order.44 Hammond concluded his 
defence by discrediting those who identified Diodorus’ categorization of the two separate events 
                                                          
38 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 172 
39 According to Hammond, the treaty which guaranteed mutual defence and economic cooperation between 
Macedonia and Olynthus also secured the return of Macedonia’s previously relinquished territory around Lake 
Bolbe. 
40 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 174 Hammond identifies doublets as “two accounts of one and the same incident, 
where one event of the two is considered historically factual”.  
41 Hammond’s critique lies in his distaste for what he considers an overt case of historical revisionism. He contends 
that the second invasion is omitted in the pursuit of creating a coherent narrative as opposed to historical truth.  
42 Diodorus Siculus Library 14.92.3-4 
43 Diodorus Siculus Library 15.19.2 
44 Isocrates credited the restoration of the kingdom’s strength to a period of three months. 
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as a historical doublet, claiming that any superficial similarities between the two separate events 
are products of their shared geographical setting.45 
 Hammond is correct in his decision to critique any in all forms of historical revisionism. 
However, the process of reinterpreting the historical record with a legitimate pretense should 
not be disregarded simply as a scholarly “fashion” as this is an ad hoc attack on the historical 
method and is without basis. Revision and reinterpretation are constantly required to deepen 
the understanding of the past. As such, the emendation of Diodorus’ nearly identical record of 
two Illyrian invasions is valid, as the specifics behind the second invasion are suspect at best. 
These historical shortcomings in Diodorus’ second passage are witnessed through the lack of 
information concerning the leader of the Illyrian invasion and the nature of Amyntas’ restoration. 
It seems illogical that an organized raid led by an Illyrian king would be followed by a disorganized 
incursion by separate tribal groups. The miraculous recovery of the kingdom is also suspect, as 
Macedonia’s internal weaknesses prevented an organized response to external threats in times 
of crisis. Therefore, while a second invasion is possible, it is more likely that the inclusion of the 
historically violent Illyrians was employed as a literary device to explain the rapid decline of 
Macedonia’s fortunes during the Chalcidice invasion of that same year. 
 Hammond ends his analysis of Amyntas III by crediting his character. He identified the 
beleaguered king as a man of remarkable courage, tenacity, and resilience.46 His kingdom is left 
significantly weaker by the power and ambition of his neighbours in Illyria and the Chalcadice 
league. Therefore, the weakness of his kingdom stems from outside influence, not his own 
incompetence as a ruler.  
The final encyclopedic source detailing the reign of Amyntas III is provided in Eugene 
Borza’s monograph, In the Shadow of Olympus: the Emergence of Macedon. Borza’s analysis 
credits the foundational impact of Hammond and Griffith to the understanding of Ancient 
Macedonia. As such, its analysis of Amyntas III followed the very same narrative structure of 
Hammond, and is chronologically ordered in a similar manner; it begins with the invasion of the 
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46 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 180 
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Illyrians and ends with the Macedonian involvement in the king’s peace. Borza shares the 
frustrations of Lane Fox and Roisman, identifying the first half of the fourth century BC as the 
most obscure period of Macedonian history.47 He viewed the reconstruction of the period as 
“problematic” as the contributions of recent scholarship, while ingenious in their ability to 
provide new insight into the understanding of ancient Macedonia, did little to facilitate the 
formulation of a singular accepted narrative of the time period in question. His analysis of the 
problems associated with the study of Ancient Macedonia are still applicable to this day, as the 
lack of ancient material deprives the prospective historian of the ability to form a coherent 
chronology for the period. 
 Borza’s analysis of the figure of Amyntas III is unique, as it credits the earlier works of 
Hammond and Griffith, while actively critiquing its various aspects. While unorthodox, the 
practice is historically sound as it fulfills the scholarly need for both reinterpretation and constant 
improvement, a process only made possible through the recognition of possible mistakes made 
by one’s scholarly predecessors. The first such example of this careful balancing act is witnessed 
in his discussion on Hammond’s acceptance of the two separate Illyrian invasions, which are 
detailed by Diodorus Siculus. Borza recognizes both sides of the argument as possibly correct, 
stating that if a historical doublet was indeed included by Diodorus, as a scholarly device or by 
mistake, it would mean that only one invasion of Amyntas realm’ took place.  He contrasts this 
possibility by stating that it was equally possible that the separate passages were not employed 
as a scholarly device but were in fact a historical reality.48 He concludes by leaving the debate 
open to further discussion, a logically sound decision which allows for the modification of his 
position on the basis of the revelation of new evidence. 
 For his discussion of the 393 BC invasion of Macedonia Borza consulted the 1979 work of 
Hammond and Griffith. He identified the leader of the Illyrian army as the Dardani king Bardylis, 
a move which mirrored the analysis found in Hammond’s monograph. However, Borza 
distinguished the temporary cohesion of the Illyrian tribes with the unified states of ancient 
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48 Borza 1990, p. 180 The passages in question are Diod. 14.92.3-4 and Diod. 15.19.2-3, they detail two separate 
invasions of Amyntas’ realm by the Illyrians. The first in 393 BC and the second a decade later in 383 BC. 
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Greece and nearby Thrace, labelling the force as not “a nation in any strict sense, but rather a 
collection of tribes.”49 He justifies his position by stating that individual tribal names were indeed 
known by the Greeks, but that it was unlikely that the tribes viewed themselves as a singular 
political entity. Therefore, their historical homogenization is the result of Greek and Roman 
perceptions. They are barbarians, like the Celts, Paeonians, and Thracians. The lack of formal 
records from the Illyrians contributed to this historical categorization, as cultural generalization 
spread to fill the gaps of historical understanding.50 This unfortunate situation leaves the 
prospective scholar at the mercy of the available source material. These Greco-Roman 
perspectives label the Illyrians as tribal in structure. As the tribe lacked any connection to the 
greater political narrative of the Greek mainland, it lends credence to the analysis of Borza, who 
viewed the invasion of 393 BC within the context of the various inland border struggles that 
occurred throughout antiquity. The frequency of these Illyrian invasions are a result of the 
geographical proximity of Macedonia51 and the disorganized nature of the Illyrian people. These 
incursions into the kingdom of Macedonia were not invasions of territorial conquest, but should 
instead be viewed as large scale raids which aimed to procure loot, often in the form of slaves, 
booty, and agriculture. The raid is tremendously successful as Amyntas III is forced from his 
throne and into exile. The status of the throne during his two year exile is uncertain. Diodorus 
briefly mentions the installation of a puppet king by the Illyrians, who he identifies as Argaeus.52  
The identity of Argaeus is contested by a few modern authors, who Borza identifies 
accordingly. Selim Islami makes Argaeus a Lyncestrian, who is set installed as a puppet king on 
the throne by the Illyrians as they held little desire to rule the defeated kingdom directly.53 
Hammond argues that Argaeus was actually a son of King Archelaus, a point which Borza contests 
due to the lack of direct evidence and the inferential nature of his argumentation.54  This critique 
is validated by Hammond’s scholarly contradiction as it opposes his earlier view that the 
                                                          
49 Borza 1990, p. 180-181 
50 Borza states that the lack of formal records led to the grouping of Illyrians with the rest of the people’s generally 
associated as barbarian by the Greeks and Romans. 
51 Borza 1990, p. 181 Borza identifies the borders of Illyria as roughly encompassing “the large region north of Epirus 
and western Macedonia, from the Adriatic coast to the Dinaric alps.  
52 Diodorus Siculus Library 14.92. 3-4 “some say Argaeus ruled Macedonia for two years” 
53 For Islami’s identification see Les Illyriens, 57-58 
54 Borza 1990, p. 296 
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Macedonians themselves deposed Amyntas, choosing to elect Argaeus instead.55 This in itself 
was contested by Borza, who doubted both the constitutional role of the Macedonian assembly, 
and the feasibility that such a function would be allowed during Illyrian occupation.56 Borza 
provides a final interpretation in the form Ellis’ chronology found in his 1969 article. Ellis contends 
that “Diodorus and Isocrates’ chronology of events does not permit sufficient time for Argaeus’ 
two year reign during the aftermath of the Illyrian invasion of 393 BC.”57 Instead, he identifies 
Argaeus as the puppet king of the Olynthians, installed after their successful invasion in 383 BC. 
Borza views this possibility as a more attractive historical reality as it coincided with the Olynthian 
occupation of Macedonia during the period.58 As such, he credits Ellis for asking the correct 
scholarly question: did Argaeus reign in Macedonia, and if so when? However, it important to 
note that Borza also critiqued Ellis’ decision to date the potential reign of Argaeus without 
considering the plausibility of his reign.59 By choosing narrative over evidence, Ellis is limited in 
his ability to effectively include Argaeus within the royal list of Macedonian kings.  As a result, 
Borza concludes that the flawed chronology of Hammond is preferable to the reinterpretation of 
Ellis.  
Borza’s evaluation of Hammond’s narrative continues through his critique of the treaty 
signed by Amyntas III in 391 BC. Unlike Hammond, who viewed the treaty as founded on the 
ideals of mutual defence and economic partnership, Borza viewed the treaty as one sided, 
through the favouring of Chalcidic interests.60 The dating of this particular treaty, due to its 
complexity and wording, should be placed in the period following the restoration of Amyntas.61 
Therefore, the lopsided nature of the treaty’s terms are to be viewed as desperate concessions 
                                                          
55 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 175 
56 Borza 1990, p. 296 
57 See Ellis (1969). Amyntas III, Illyria and Olynthos 393/2-380/79. Μακεδονικά, 9, 1-8.  
58 Borza 1990, p. 296 The Olynthian occupation included the occupation of Pella, the new capital founded by 
Archelaus. For an ancient source on the specifics of the occupation one can consult Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.13. 
59 Borza 1990, p. 297 
60 Borza 1990, p. 183 Borza argues that “the treaty accorded the Chalcadice league an unprecedented freedom to 
trade in goods traditionally under Macedonian control, while isolating the potential allies of Macedonia from joining 
together in the face of Olynthus’ expansion.” 
61 Borza 1990, p. 183 Borza states that the long term nature of the treaty did not coincide with the desperation of 
the moment (Illyrian occupation). Also, the wording of the treaty does not correlate with the panic land grant given 
by Amyntas III on the eve of the Illyrian invasion of 393 BC.  
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made in the hopes of ensuring the stability of his kingdom’s eastern frontier. This particular 
critique is the last Borza makes during his discussion of Amyntas III as he merely reiterates the 
narrative established by Hammond for the remainder of his analysis. 
The final analysis of Amyntas III in the modern source material will be conducted in the 
form of a comparative analysis of how each scholar viewed the rule of Amyntas III.  The first 
perspectives to be considered will involve the more modern works of Roisman and Lane Fox’s 
general histories. These in turn will be followed by the views of Hammond and Borza.  Roisman 
characterized Amyntas in an amiable fashion, labelling the Macedonian king as a competent 
general and energetic administrator.62 This positive view of Amyntas is brief but sufficient, 
highlighting the qualities of a king whose history has been often overlooked.  
Lane Fox acknowledged the two recent reassessments of Amyntas III by Michael Zahrnt 
as the foundational argument in favour of Amyntas III having a successful reign.63 Zahrnt believed, 
rightly so, that the success of Amyntas’ reign was dimmed by both the fragmentary nature of the 
source material and the monumental achievements of his son Philip II. The length of his reign is 
a remarkable achievement in a time of great upheaval for the kingdom. 64 Therefore, the stability 
of his lengthy reign is what allows for the eventual success of Philip II. Pella, the city identified by 
Xenophon as the finest in all the kingdom, would become the habitual seat of the Macedonian 
kings from Amyntas’ rule onwards. The capital would be continually transformed over the 
duration of his reign, becoming a city which very much resembled the typical poleis of the Greek 
south.65 This achievement, usually associated with the reign of Archelaus, emphasized the desire 
of the Macedonian kings to be accepted as Greek in the eyes of their southern neighbours.66 This 
cultural transformation, begun by Archelaus and continued by Amyntas III received attention 
                                                          
62  Roisman, Worthington 2010, p. 161 
63 Lane Fox 2011, p. 227 The articles in question are M. Zahrnt, “Amyntas III: Fall und Aufstieg eines 
Makedonenkönigs,” Hermes 134 (2006), 127–41; M. Zahrnt, “Amyntas III und die Griechischen Mächte,” Ancient 
Macedonia 7 (Thessaloniki, 2007), pp. 239–51. Note that Zahrnt’s accounts are in German and have yet to have been 
translated into English. 
64 Lane Fox treats the 24 year reign of Amyntas as an achievement due to the short reigns of his predecessors. 
Between 399-393 BC, a total of six kings ruled the kingdom. Their reigns ended often times with violence born from 
the inherent amphimetric strife of the royal court. 
65 Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.13 
66 For a detailed argument on Pella as the seat of Amyntas III’s kingdom see M. B. Hatzopoulos and L. D. Loukopoulou, 
Two Studies In Ancient Macedonian Topography (Athens, 1987), pp. 42–5. 
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from the cities of Greece, as Macedon was allowed representation at the Kings Peace, a 
deliberation attended only by representatives considered “Greek”. The rejuvenation of the 
kingdom’s strength was also felt by an expansion of Macedon’s influence over its neighbours, as 
the stability of the kingdoms’ administration allowed for the undertaking of a more dynamic 
foreign policy.67 Zarhnt completes his argument by pointing to the later reference of an 
“Amynteion” festival which took place in Pydna.68 If this festival did indeed occur, it would 
represent the reception of divine honours on the part of Amyntas, a feat never achieved before 
by any Greek king. 
 Based on this consideration of Zahrnt’s argument, one can assume that Lane Fox agreed 
with his assessment of Amyntas’ reign. This is only partly correct, as Lane Fox mentions that the 
extraordinary nature of Amyntas’ achievements are tempered by their context. The 
aforementioned Amynteion is likely limited to a singular historical context. The source which 
mentioned the festival is not contemporary to the reign of Amyntas III and has been soundly 
rejected by some scholars due to the lack of an inherent link between the timing of the source 
and the date of Amyntas’ reign. The source which mentions the festival, Demosthenes’ scholiast, 
comments that “Philip killed citizens in Pydna even when they took refuge in the “Amynteion” 
which they had built while flattering his father.”69 Lane Fox’s critique of the source stems from 
his use of Badian. Badian dismissed the source as yet another example of overt rhetoric, spun 
from the creation of a historical fabrication.70  Therefore, as the process of personal deification 
is not attested in any great detail until the reign of Philip II, it is correct to assume that the 
deification did not occur.  If it did, it was limited in scope, a local nicety provided by thankful 
citizens for a particular benefaction. The designation of Pella as the premier royal residence of 
Amyntas III can be similarly rejected as the use of Aegae as a fortified stronghold points to its 
equal standing in the eyes of the royal family, as it could be counted on as a source of security in 
                                                          
67 Lane Fox 2011, p. 228 Lane Fox states that Epigraphic evidence shows that he was also asked to arbitrate on 
boundaries disputes between Elimea and Thessalian Doliche in the Perrhaebia. The king’s ability to act as mediator 
displayed a newfound confidence in the kingdom to influence the affairs of its lesser neighbours. 
68 See Scholiast on Demosthenes 1.5 
69 Ibid. 
70 Badian’s argument can be read in his chapter concerning the deification of Alexander the Great. See: E. Badian, 
“The Deification of Alexander the Great,” in H. J. Dell, ed., Ancient Macedonian Studies In Honor of Charles F. Edson 
(Thessaloniki, 1981), pp. p. 40 for the passage in question. 
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times of duress.71 Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the formal adaptation of Pella as the 
royal capital was not enforced until the later rule of Philip II. As such, the association of Pella with 
the rule of Amyntas III cannot be confirmed without further archaeological evidence. Lastly, Lane 
Fox also states that the act of arbitration did not necessarily display proof of an all embracing 
strength of royal authority.72 This misconception is further challenged by the fact that neither of 
the cities involved in the royal arbitration were under Macedonian control at the time.73 
Therefore, the strength of his royal authority, contrary to the argument of Zahrnt, was limited by 
the extent of his influence amongst his various neighbours.  
Hammond provides a more sobering analysis of Amyntas’ reign, stating that “the kingdom 
he left was weaker than that which he had inherited.”74 The two Illyrian invasions75, coupled with 
the brief period of Illyrian suzerainty had left the country impoverished. This in turn was 
compounded by the effect of the Olynthian occupation of its eastern territories, a period which 
also likely ended with the looting of Macedonia’s resources. Militarily, the royal army was inferior 
to that of his Upper Macedonian neighbour Derdas, the king of Elimea.76 The economic potential 
of the kingdom was stunted through the looting of Macedonia’s eastern environs.77 These 
factors, coupled with the expansionist ambitions of his neighbours made Macedonia a prime 
target of external aggression. However, this does not mean that Hammond viewed Amyntas in a 
negative light. Instead, he credits the character of Amyntas III, identifying him as a man of 
courage, tenacity, and resilience. Therefore, the rule of Amyntas III is summarized by Hammond 
as one crippled by outside influences, not royal inadequacy.  
                                                          
71 During the Chalcidice invasion of Macedonia, Amyntas III is attested to have established a defence around the old 
capital of Aegae after being driven from Pella. It is from this stronghold that he is able to regain his throne.  
72 Lane Fox 2011, p. 230 
73 Lane Fox 2011, p. 231  
74 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 179 Hammond provided the following sources Diodorus Siculus 15.60.3, Justin 7.4.8, 
and Isocrates 6.46 as proof for the chronological placement of Amyntas III’s death in the year 370 BC.  
75 The invasions in question take place in 393 BC and 370 BC. 
76 Hammond mentions that the king was little more than a vassal of Sparta. This was likely stated to reinforce the 
insignificance of Macedonia’s military strength. 
77 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p. 179 Hammond quotes Xenophon 5.2.43, 5.3.1, and 5.3.3 to contextualize the 
destruction of Chalcidice’s economic potential. He mentions that Olive trees were cut down by both sides, a practice 
which would ultimately cripple the region’s economic viability.  
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Borza’s summation of Amyntas’ rule follows a similar format to that of Hammond. He 
identified his reign as a study in survival.78 The culmination of internal turmoil79 and external 
pressures80 led to a situation many would deem untenable. Borza states that the weakness of the 
army forced the king to depend on external allies, an act which sacrificed the kingdoms’ 
autonomy in the hope of preserving its integrity. He concludes his analysis by rejecting the impact 
of Archelaus’ reforms as illusory and superficial in nature.81 He goes on to state that the inability 
of Amyntas to effectively respond to the various pressures of his reign was no fault of his own. 
Instead, the backwards nature of Macedonia’s social, economic, and political infrastructure left 
the kingdom functioning in a manner not all that different to that of their so called “barbarian” 
neighbours, whose success, like Macedon, depended on the sporadic power of their army and 
the skills of their king.82  
The establishment of a narrative concerning the rule of Amyntas III is especially tedious 
due to the fragmented nature of the source material, a reality which results in the highly 
contested viewpoints of the aforementioned authors. As such, it is necessary to incorporate the 
most logical points made by each author, as the goal of this investigation is to provide the most 
comprehensive analysis of the king’s turbulent rule. Therefore, it is the opinion of the author that 
the reign of Amyntas III is indeed one dominated by the internal weakness of royal authority, a 
situation instigated by the sudden death of Archelaus. The subsequent period of anarchy eroded 
Macedonia’s stability, leaving a kingdom bereft by internal squabbles and overt amphimetric 
strife.83 Amyntas’ twenty four year reign on the throne represents a return to relative stability 
not seen since Archelaus, a testament to his administrative abilities. Therefore, the troubles of 
the kingdom are not a result of his own inadequacy as a ruler. Instead, the trouble of Amyntas’s 
                                                          
78 Borza 1990, p.188 
79 Borza highlights the sudden death of Archelaus and the subsequent anarchy as integral to the destabilization of 
the kingdom and the weakening of royal authority. 
80 Borza believes that the Illyrian invasion was unanticipated, a result of the historical movement of the Balkan tribes. 
He contrasts this with the ascension of Olynthus, a process which he credits to the actions of Amyntas’ predecessor 
Perdiccas II.  
81 Borza 1990, p.188 Borza identifies the grandeur and wealth of the kingdom as fleeting in nature, limited to the 
short reign of Archelaus. 
82 Borza 1990, p.189 
83 The subsequent bouts of regicide resulted in the elimination of both the line of Perdiccas and Archelaus. 
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rule is to be attributed to the expansionist ambitions of his neighbours, and the inherent 
weaknesses of the Macedonian state: namely the weakness of its army, and the backwards 
nature of its institutions. By definition, Amyntas’ rule should be viewed as a miraculous study in 
royal survival. Against all odds he secured the continuation of his kingdom’s existence, allowing 
for the eventual ascension of Macedonia to the position of premier power in Greece. As such, his 




















Chapter 2: Epigraphic Evidence and Numismatic Interpretations of Amyntas III 
 
 The limitations of the source material for the reign of Amyntas III is not limited to the 
literary record, as there are precious few supplementary sources of contemporary evidence for 
his rule. Regardless, for the formation of a comprehensive analysis it is vital to consult both the 
epigraphic and numismatic avenues of historical interpretation. These secondary sources of 
historical research are important to the study of Amyntas III as they provide the prospective 
scholar with contemporary evidence freed from the intrinsic bias of the modern historian. This 
does not mean that these sources are without fault. Epigraphic evidence in particular, is limited 
by its preservation, with records often fragmentary in nature, a factor which results in an 
incomplete understanding of the historical source. Epigraphic records are also limited by the 
nature of their provenance. This holds especially true for Macedonian epigraphy as little to no 
evidence exists.  However, this apparent dearth of available source material does not mean no 
evidence exists, as fragmentary records detailing the treaties of Macedonian kings have been 
recovered and subsequently translated for the purpose of historical study.84 However, while 
these sources are integral to the understanding of Amyntas III in the eyes of his contemporaries, 
it is important to recognise their shortcomings. These issues are mainly associated with a 
potential for bias, as the provenance of the epigraphic source is intrinsically linked to the bias of 
its writer. This applies to the epigraphic material concerning Amyntas III as the remaining 
evidence available to the modern scholar is limited to the writings of Macedonias’ neighbours. 
As such, the interpretation of any and all epigraphic evidence must be examined in a similarly 
critical fashion to the literary records of Macedonia’s contemporaries, as the records of the 
Athenians and Olynthians is likely to reflect the intrinsic biases of the day, resulting in a warped 
representation of the Macedonian king. 
 The scholarly interpretation of coins, otherwise referred to as numismatics, provides 
supplementary evidence beneficial to the understanding of Amyntas III through an unbiased 
                                                          
84 For a comprehensive collection of Ancient Greek Epigraphy, see PJ Rhodes and Robin Osborne’s 2004 text titled 
Greek Historical Inscriptions. Also see Miltiades V Hatzopoulos’ Macedonian Institutions Under the Kings Volume 1 
for an interpretation of the available epigraphy, and volume 2 for the epigraphic appendix.  
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presentation of how the king wished to portray himself to his contemporaries. The limitations of 
this avenue of evidence lies in its preservation, as the understanding of the coin is limited on the 
basis of how readily the source can be interpreted, a factor limited by the coins’ provenance and 
preservation. The value of a coin to the understanding of a historical figure is also limited as only 
so much can be inferred from the analysis of an image without the corresponding literary 
evidence. Regardless, the interpretation of Amyntas III in coins allows for a potential analysis of 
how the Macedonians linked the king’s image with the concept of royal authority. The value of 
these coins can also provide an insight into the success of a ruler and the strength of the 
Macedonian economy, as the size and material of the coin in question coupled with its context 
can provide insight into the complex discussion of royal monopolies, and how the control of 
Macedonia’s natural resources led to the strengthening of royal authority.  
 In the previous chapter, the analysis of Lane Fox’s monograph highlighted the treaty 
signed between Amyntas III and Olynthus.85 This document, discovered in the ruin of ancient 
Olynthus, currently represents the only epigraphic inscription to bear the name of Amyntas III. 
As such, the stele’s status as the singular source of contemporary epigraphic analysis makes it 
indispensable to the understanding of Amyntas III. Therefore, due to both the significance of the 
treaty and the scarcity of supplementary evidence, a multifaceted approach to the understanding 
of the inscription will be employed. First, the provenance of the stone stele will be analysed to 
gain an appreciation of the source’s historical context. This introduction to the stele will be 
followed by a detailed description of the treaty. Ultimately, this process will be concluded by a 
brief observation of how various historians viewed the epigraphic source. 
 The treaty between Amyntas III and Olynthus was uncovered in the ruins of the ancient 
city in the year 1844, by Austrian excavators.86 It was subsequently sent by the Austrian consul 
at Thessaloniki to the Kunsthistorisches Museum87 in Vienna for exhibition, cataloguing and 
study, where it is housed to this day. In the epigraphic appendix of Hatzopoulos’ Macedonian 
Institutions under the Kings: Volume Two, he identifies the find as a “Flat-topped, opisthographic 
                                                          
85 For a brief summation of the treaties’ effects see pg. 12 
86 Hatzopoulos 1996, p.19  
87 The Austrian Museum of Art History. The inventory number provided by Hatzopoulos is no III 102. 
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stele of white marble with small moulding at the top, broken at the bottom but eventually 
restored to be built into a cement case. His description continues by stating that the surface of 
side Β had been worn off in the middle, probably as a consequence of the stele being used as a 
washing plank.88 From this brief description a few conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
provenance of the inscribed stele. First, the stele does not represent an artifact found in its 
original archaeological context. Second, the preservation of the stele is not complete as 
secondary use, coupled with the ravages of time, result in the degradation of the source material. 
Finally, the removal of Macedonia’s cultural history, while deplorable, is subject to the context 
of its time. Greece did not hold jurisdiction over the region of Macedonia until the aftermath of 
the Balkan War of 1912. Therefore, the sale of historical goods was subject to the desires of the 
weakening Ottoman state. As such, the acquisition of the stone stele by the Austrian Empire is 
another example of the exploitative nature of European interest in the classical past, in which 
the historical fabric of ancient Greece is sold to the highest bidder in the interest of monetary 
gain. 
 For a detailed translation of the treaty one consults the work of PJ Rhodes and Robin 
Osborne.89  The treaty is inscribed in the Ionic dialect90 and possesses the occasional Atticism.91 
The terms of the treaty are detailed on both sides of the inscribed stone stele, resulting in a two 
part description. 
 The front of the stele details the defensive alliance established by Macedonia and 
Olynthus. The first line identifies the treaty as an agreement with Amyntas son of Errhidaeus.92 
Two observations can be made from an analysis of this line. First, the wording of the phrase 
presents the treaty as Olynthian in origin93, a correlation which matches the initial provenance 
                                                          
88 Hatzopoulos 1996, p.19  
89 See PJ Rhodes, Robin Osborne Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC for an English translation of the epigraphic 
material compiled by Miltiades V Hatzopoulos in his 1996 monograph Macedonian Institutions Under the Kings 
Volume 2. 
90 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.54 The editors state that the dialect of the treaty was Eubobean-Ionic 
91 Ibid. The Atticism can be identified through a noticeable pattern. The pattern in question involves the ending of 
each line with the end of a word or syllable. For an image of the stele see Hatzopoulos plate I/II in Macedonian 
Institutions Under the Kings    
92 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.55 
93 “Agreement with Amyntas son of Errhidaeus.” 
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of the stele. The second observation involves the presentation of Amyntas III, mainly through 
how he was portrayed by the Chalcidicans in writing. He is addressed by name alone and is 
associated with the figure of Errhidaeus. This simplistic identification is possibly a product of 
Olynthian design; a stylistic choice to reject Amyntas’ royal authority. However, the truth is likely 
more benign, with the simplicity of the line explained as a product of function. The portrayal of 
Errhidaeus as Amyntas’ father is equally important as it provides contemporary evidence which 
disproves the slanderous accusations of Amyntas’ royal rivals.94 The second line of the inscription 
modifies the wording of the first, identifying the treaty as an agreement between Amyntas and 
the Chalcidicans. The purpose of the line is to identify the inscription as the work of Olynthian 
chroniclers. The steles’ representation of Olynthus as leader of the Chalcidican people 
symbolized its lofty territorial ambitions.95  Finally, the difference in governmental structures was 
exacerbated through the line’s wording, with the hierarchical authority of Amyntas contrasted 
by the seemingly equal standing of the Chalcidican representatives. The remainder of the frontal 
aspect of the inscription details the intricacies of the proposed defensive alliance. A period of 
fifty years, the traditional length of treaties considered to last “for life”, was established. The 
alliance was to be purely defensive, and was to be limited to a bilateral agreement of mutual 
security. It is at this point that the inscription ends, with the remainder of the agreement left to 
conjecture. 
 The back of the stele details the economic and diplomatic arrangements reached by 
Amyntas III and Olynthus. The export of pitch and Macedonian timber, for personal use and 
military construction, was guaranteed.96 The quantity of such exports was not restricted as long 
as the proper dues were paid, an arrangement which hypothetically allowed unrestricted access 
to Macedonia’s strategic resources, a potential oversight which greatly benefited Olynthus. In 
this section of the treaty, a distinction between the Chalcidicans and the koinon of the 
Chalcidicans is made. This shrewd distinction between the overarching state and the local 
                                                          
94 Lane Fox 2011, p.220 See Justin 7.4.3 for the later association of Amyntas III with the figure of Menelaus, a man 
identified as either the bastard son or slave of Aeropus. 
95 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.56 Rhodes and Osbourne quote Thucydides I.58.ii which states that “Olynthus aspired to 
be the centre of a Chalcidican state.”  
96 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.56   
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community is a linguistic masterstroke with overarching economic ramifications. In essence, the 
Olynthian distinction between the needs of the koinon and the needs of the Chalcidican’s allowed 
for the securing of ship building timbers, a strategic resource traditionally under the authority of 
the Macedonian king. This oversight on the part of the Macedonian king is likely an act of 
desperation made from a position of weakness, a reactive attempt to secure the kingdom’s 
territorial integrity at the cost of its economic prosperity. The acquiescence to Olynthian 
demands, coupled with the vague application of royal dues97  seemingly formulates an 
arrangement which served Olynthian interests at the expense of Macedonian economic strength. 
This is only partly true, as Rhodes and Osbourne state that the proposed guarantee of export 
rights demonstrates the prior refusal of such an arrangement on the part of previous Macedonian 
administrations.98 As such, the granting of export rights to the Chalcidicans, an agreement 
offered in exchange for military protection represents a tactful recognition of Macedonia’s 
intrinsic shortcomings. The military, once lauded during the reign of Archelaus, was rendered 
insignificant in the aftermath of the Illyrian invasion of 393 BC.99 Unable to defend his strategically 
valuable monopoly but unwilling to part with it, the treaty represents the best possible resolution 
for the beleaguered monarch. It secured Olynthian support in case of invasion, resulted in the 
collection of valuable revenues from the export of Macedonian timber, and temporarily diverted 
the expansionist gaze of Olynthus, a reprieve which allowed Amyntas to restore internal stability 
to a kingdom previously wracked by a decade of amphimetric strife.  
 The second section of the treaty identified on the back of the stone stele details a joint 
agreement between Amyntas III and Olynthus to cease all diplomatic overtures with the following 
communities:  the Amphipolitans, Bottiaeans, Acanthians, and Mendaeans.100 Arrangements 
with the aforementioned states were permitted, but only when the powers agreed jointly to 
foster friendships, a situation which ultimately prevented the expansion of both Macedon and 
Olynthus’ diplomatic influence.101 Ultimately, this aspect of the treaty benefitted Amyntas and 
                                                          
97 “There shall be export and transport of the other things on the transference of the appropriate dues,…”  
98 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.58  
99 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p.172 
100 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.57  
101 Rhodes identifies the states of Amphipolis, Bottiaea, Acanthus, and Mende as hostile towards the Olynthians. The 
geographical distance between the cities (Bottiaea was to the north of Olynthus, Mende was on the western prong 
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the kingdom of Macedon as it temporarily halted the expansion of Olynthian influence into 
Macedon’s eastern environs, areas which contained the bulk of Macedon’s economic potential. 
 The final section of the inscription reiterates the military alliance of Macedonia and 
Olynthus, with each signatory of the treaty agreeing to honour the defensive alliance outlined on 
the opposite side of the stele. It represents an oath of mutual assistance, a guarantee of good 
faith, and a recognition of the integrity of each state’s domain.102 
 Historical interpretations concerning the treaty are limited in scope; with scholarly 
interest manifested mainly in the establishment of a clear chronology and a recognition of its 
structure. Regardless, a few key observations have been provided. The first observation concerns 
the dating of the stele. The establishment of a concrete point of origin is not possible due to the 
lack of a date provided in the treaty itself.103 As such, an alternative form of relative dating has 
been employed by scholars interested in the epigraphic source. This employment of historical 
conjecture, while vague in its accuracy, allows for the pinpointing of a period of origin for the 
artifact in question, a vital step in both the historical and archeological understanding of the stele. 
Rhodes and Osbourne provide two separate points of origin for the inscribing of the treaty 
between the two regional powers of northern Greece. The first possible point of a settlement 
between the two occurs in 393 BC, when Amyntas III was credited with the granting of a gift of 
land to the “Chalcidicans”.104 Therefore, the possibility of a treaty occurring during this earlier 
period is possible as the granting of land could be interpreted in the treaty as unrestricted 
economic access. However, the aspects of the treaty detail arrangements which are meant to 
last.105 The establishment of secure economic arrangements is an illogical step for a kingdom 
facing potential subjugation at the hands of the Illyrians. This revelation, coupled with the fact 
that the Thessalians, not the Chalcidicans, came to the aid of Macedon, casts doubt on the use 
                                                          
of Chalcidice, Acanthus north of the eastern prong, and Amphipolis 50 miles (75 km.) north-east of Olynthus.) 
represents both the reach of Olynthus’ ambition and its military potential. 
102 What remains of the oath of the alliance between Amyntas and Olynthus is as follows: I shall guard what has been 
established by the Chalcidians; and if any one goes against Amyntas, into his land for war, I shall go to support 
Amyntas…. (the passage ends abruptly at this point) 
103 The context of the stele’s discovery (during the antiquarian period of Archaeological study), prevented the 
employment of the more modern forms of absolute dating (i.e. Radio carbon dating) 
104 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.56  
105 The term length of the treaty mentioned a fifty year agreement between the two states. 
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of this earlier date as a possible point of origin for the inscription.106 Therefore, the second 
possible date for the construction of the Macedonian-Olynthian treaty seems like a more logical 
choice for the construction of a historical chronology. According to Diodorus Siculus, the Illyrians 
invaded Macedonia a second time in the year 383 BC as a part of a larger scale invasion of 
southern Greece.107 Amyntas’ miraculous recovery is appropriately vague, and it is likely that the 
second invasion never took place.108 It is following this “miraculous recovery” that Amyntas III 
demanded the return of the previously granted land rights, which were likely established prior to 
this period.109 As such, the dating of the treaty likely correlates with the year 391 BC as it is in this 
year that Amyntas regains control of his kingdom from Illyrian influence after two years spent in 
exile. The need for allies in this volatile period necessitated the crafting of a treaty which would 
guarantee long term stability for the kingdom. The generous economic concessions provided 
through the unrestricted access of Macedonia’s valuable timber reserves were necessary 
sacrifices in the pursuit of this goal. However, it is unwise to assume that Amyntas only made 
concessions in the pursuit of internal stability. This assumption is proven incorrect through the 
analysis of what is likely considered one of Amyntas’ many demands. The demand in question, 
located on the second stanza of the stele, outlines the prevention of local alliances, except in the 
case of a joint agreement. This demand served a similar function to the granting of free exports 
by limiting the expansionist tendencies of Olynthus. Therefore, the treaty acted as a guarantor 
of Macedonian independence in the face of Olynthian expansion. Their view of the treaty mirrors 
the opinion of Beloch, who believed that the similarities of the two Illyrian invasions were the 
result of a historical doublet.110 This view, while likely correct, is contested by both Hammond 
and Ellis.111 As the historical debate remains unsolved it is prudent to leave all possibilities open 
to interpretation until further evidence presents itself. Regardless, it seems that the position of 
                                                          
106 The granting of land to Chalcidice was offered in exchange for military support. As none was provided by the 
Chalcidice state, the land was likely returned or never exchanged in the first place. This revelation supports the view 
of Hammond who states that the “granting of land was for use, not outright possession.” See Hammond 1979, p.173 
107 Diodorus Siculus 14.92.3-4 
108 It is another of Diodorus’ historical doublets, with the first invasion occurring in history, followed by the literary 
repetition of a similar incursion ten years later. 
109 Rhodes, Osborne 2004 p.56 
110 Ibid.  
111 They argue for the occurrence of two separate Illyrian invasions. 
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Rhodes and Osborne is sound as it logically provides a reason for the signing of the treaty. 
Therefore, the chronology of Rhodes and Osborne will be consulted during the sequential 
chapters detailing the specifics of Amyntas’ reign. 
 The study of Macedonian coinage, otherwise known as numismatics, provides another 
interpretation of Amyntas III. Evidence, like in the case of epigraphy, is disappointingly scarce. 
Regardless, the interpretation of Macedonian coinage serves two distinct purposes to the 
understanding of Amyntas III. First, the description of royal coinage allows for an analysis of royal 
representation. Second, the value and weight of the coinage provide evidence of the kingdom’s 
economic viability, a true indicator of the king’s situation. 
 Roisman and Worthington state that the production of royal coinage began during the 
reign of Alexander I.112 Capitalising on the withdrawal of the Persians, Alexander is said to have 
acquired the valuable silver mines previously administered by the Thracians.113 The extraction of 
silver was an extremely profitable monopoly for Alexander, with sources stating that a talent 
worth of silver was produced from the mine at Lake Prasias alone.114 The control of these valuable 
mines would dominate Macedonian foreign policy for the remainder of the kingdom’s history, 
with wars often fought over control of its valuable silver deposits. Macedonia’s hold on the region 
was tenuous at best, evidenced by the decline in coinage quality following the reign of Alexander 
I. This is first witnessed during the reign of Perdiccas II as his currency, limited to the production 
of light and heavy tetrobols, represents a decline in complexity and coin quality.115 The 
modification of royal circulations would continue through the reign of Archelaus, who was the 
first Macedonian king to have inscribed his name on the coins’ surface.116 It is during the reign of 
Archelaus that the function of royal coinage changed, with the silver coins relegated to use for 
matters of diplomacy. For internal dissemination bronze coins were circulated. Silver coinage was 
                                                          
112 Roisman, Worthington, 2010 p.50 
113 Ibid. 
114 Herodotus 5.17 
115 Roisman, Worthington, 2010 p.51 The coins of Alexander I are praised by Roisman for their complexity and 
quantity. The production of octadrachams, measured at 28 grams, and tetradrachams, measured at 13 grams 
represents a complex delineation of weight standards not again replicated in Macedonian coins until the reign of 




limited to the production of staters, which measured 10-11 grams in weight.117 The use of 
symbolic motifs, often associated with the presentation of royal authority, represented the only 
modification of Macedonian currency during this period.  
 Amyntas III’s royal coinage represents the impoverishment of the Macedonian economy, 
with the majority of his coins minted in bronze alone. Silver coinage did exist but the quality of 
such editions were poor, both in their purity and weight.118 Hammond surmises that “the 
emblems of Amyntas’ coinage stressed the newfound claim of the new line of the royal family to 
be descended from Heracles.”119 Mythological symbols of Heracles: his head, his club, and the 
mythical boar, feature prominently in the coins of Amyntas. The inclusion of new symbols are 
also witnessed. These symbols feature an eagle standing on and striking a snake.120 The use of 
earlier emblems are also witnessed, with the presentation of an unattended standing horse 
representative of the earlier emblems employed during the reign of Alexander I. The images are 
unitary in function. The link to Heracles legitimizes the rule of Amyntas while the callback to the 
reign of Alexander serves as a promise of future greatness. The complexity of such coins would 
improve by the end of his reign. This is witnessed through the production of a fine full weight 
didrachm of silver. The complexity of this royal mint was displayed through the emblem, an 
emblem in which a hunting scene was portrayed. The figures in the scene are: a rider on a 
prancing horse holding a spear, and a lion biting at said spear. The horse carried a caduceus brand 
on its crupper, a motif witnessed by Hammond in the coins of the Bisaltae tribes.121 The inclusion 
of such a motif hints at the resurgence of Macedonian authority, demonstrated through the 
possession of the silver mines. As such, the presentation of Amyntas changed accordingly, with 
the royal coinage presented as evidence of Amyntas’ accomplishments and Macedon’s 
burgeoning potential as a force capable of recognition in Greek affairs. 
                                                          
117 Roisman, Worthington, 2010 p.51 
118 Hammond 1979, p.180 
119 Ibid. 
120 The image of the eagle alludes to the mythological father of Heracles: Zeus. The striking of a snake alludes to the 
miraculous feat achieved by Heracles during his infancy. (Heracles had strangled the serpents dropped by Hera into 
his crib).  
121 Hammond 1979, p.180 
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 Chapter 3: A Period of Instability, 399-393 BC 
 
 The brief but highly successful reign of the Macedonian king Archelaus came to an abrupt 
end in the year 399 BC when he was killed during a hunting trip by a man named Crateuas.122 
Crateuas is presented in the source material as Archelaus’ beloved, a position which influenced 
his portrayal by contemporary scholars. The first version of events, provided by Diodorus Siculus, 
identified the death of the king as a horrific accident, the side effect of a hunting expedition gone 
wrong.123 A second version of the events, appearing in the work of Aristotle,124 labeled the 
murder of Archelaus as a crime of passion, the result of mistreatment and continued 
exploitation.125 The murderous act of Crateuas is further complicated by the identification of a 
conspiracy against the king led by Decamnichus, one of the king’s royal advisors at Pella.126 This 
deadly collusion between the two royal pages also involved a man by the name of Hellanocrates 
of Larissa.127 These men, united in their desire to murder the king, differed in their motivation. 
Crateuas’ part in the plot likely stemmed from a combination of Archelaus’ betrayal of trust and 
his continual sexual exploitation.128 Dechamnichus’ reasons to formulate a plot against the king’s 
life likely stemmed from a sense of embarrassment and broken pride. Hammond identifies his 
unjust flogging at the hands of Euripides as a catalyst for the conspiracy, as the action 
represented a public humiliation which would forever tarnish his standing in the royal court.129 
Finally, Hellanocrates’ association with the plot stemmed from Archelaus’ inability to restore him 
to Larissa.130 This broken promise, coupled with Archelaus’ pressing of unwanted sexual 
                                                          
122 Hammond employs the use of Crateuas for the naming of Archelaus’ killer. Other spellings of the name include: 
Craterus, Crateas, Crataeas. 
123 Diodorus Siculus 14.37.6 
124 Aristotle Politics 13IIb 8-35 
125 Aristotle mentions a broken promise made by Archelaus as the motivating factor behind Crateuas’ actions. The 
promise involved Crateuas being offered the hand of one of Archelaus’ daughters for marriage. 
126 Decamnichus and Crateuas’ status as royal pages explain their presence during the royal hunting trip. 
127 Hammond believes that Hellanocrates was a member of the Aluedae of Larissa, the traditional aristocratic ruling 
party of Thessaly allied to the Macedonian kings. See Hammond 1979, p. 168  
128 Archelaus’ affair with Crateuas is detailed by Plutarch Amatorius 23 “For Crateas killed Archelaus, who had rid 
him in his youth”  
129 Hammond 1979, p.167 Dechamnichus was flogged for commenting on Euripides’ foul breath, a comment which 
enraged the king’s favoured poet. 
130 Ibid.  
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advances131, created a situation in which regicide could be justified. Later interpretations 
speculate that Crateuas claimed the throne of Macedonia following his murder of Archelaus, a 
claim Hammond vehemently denies.132  Using these disparate plots one can formulate a basic 
chronology for the order of events associated with the death of Archelaus. From this chronology 
two observations can be made.  First, one can conclude that Archelaus was killed on a hunting 
expedition by the javelin of Crateuas. The second conclusion involves the identification of a trial 
by the assembly of the Macedonians. The outcome of such a trial is uncertain as two possible 
outcomes could result from Crateuas’ prosecution by the assembly.   
The first scenario results in the assembly finding Crateuas and his co-conspirators 
suspicious. Unfortunately, they are unable to prove such an assertion due to a lack of concrete 
evidence. Regrettably, one cannot determine whether the ineffective nature of the assembly was 
a result of ineptitude or the extension of the conspiracy to the members of the assembly. 
Hopefully, upon the discovery of new evidence, a conclusion can be made. The alternative 
outcome of such a trial would result in the acquittal of Crateuas, on the ground that Archelaus’ 
death was indeed an accident.133 Regardless, the fate of Crateuas is left unanswered as he 
disappears from the historical record following his murder of the Macedonian king. His actions 
left an immediate effect on the stability of the kingdom as Macedonia, once credited by 
Thucydides for its developmental strides during the reign of Archelaus, veered on the brink of 
collapse.134  
 The intervening years between the death of Archelaus and the ascension of Amyntas can 
be viewed as a period of anarchy, where the weakness of royal authority facilitated dynastic 
struggle. Representatives from all branches of the royal family would compete for the vacant 
                                                          
131 Hammond mentions that Hellanocrates was exposed to the lust of the king. The use of such phrasing points 
towards the act lacking consent.  
132 Hammond 1979, p.167 
133 Hammond preferred the former interpretation, as the authority of Aristotle as a historical source outweighs 
whoever reported the death of Archelaus as accidental. Marsyas of Macedon is provided as a potential translation 
for this position. It is the opinion of this author that this position is logically sound; that a conspiracy took place, and 
that this conspiracy resulted in the death of the king and the conducting of a trial thereafter.   
134 See Thucydides 2.100.1-2 
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throne, resulting in the elimination of both the royal line of Archelaus and Perdiccas.135  Diodorus 
Siculus once again provides the context for this volatile period, labelling the term lengths of each 
Macedonian king up until the ascension of Amyntas III. A total of four kings would rule Macedonia 
during this period beginning with the infant Orestes.136 Orestes’ ancestry is unknown, with no 
contemporary evidence existing in the ancient source material to link him to the recently 
deceased Macedonian king Archelaus.137 Hammond proposed that Orestes was the son of 
Archelaus, on the basis that the assembly elected him following Archelaus’ death. This 
identification of the name of Orestes with the crown of Macedon represented an assumption 
based on conjecture, an unfortunate but necessary step for the crafting of a complete historical 
chronology. Hopefully, in the near future new context will be revealed. Until then, it is 
Hammond’s assumption which forms the foundation of all historical chronologies during this 
period.138 Orestes, an infant at the time of his ascension, was subject to the supervision of a royal 
regent. The regent would carry out the administrative running of the Macedonian state until the 
young king reached the age of maturity. The regent for Orestes was a man by the name of 
Aeropus.139 Aeropus’ association with the family of Archelaus is relatively unknown with many 
simply referring to him as the “son of Perdiccas.”140 Aeropus would rule in Orestes’ name for a 
period of two years from 399-397 BC. Not content with the position of regent, Aeropus is said to 
have killed the infant king before he was able to reach maturity, an act confirmed by the 
chronology of Diodorus Siculus.141 He would usurp the title of king, ruling for a period of three 
years from 397-394 BC. The sole evidence for the development of a new Macedonian policy 
attributed to his reign is witnessed through his interaction with the Spartan commander 
Agesilaus. The details of Aeropus’ interaction is relayed by Borza. The king is said to have denied 
                                                          
135 Borza 1990, p.178 Borza mentions that two previous lines of the royal family had been eliminated in a similar 
struggle for royal authority; the line of Philip (removed by Perdiccas II and Sitacles), and the line of Alcetas 
(Archelaus?) See Plato’s Gorgias for more details concerning the potential actions of Archelaus upon his ascension. 
136 Hammond 1979, p.168 
137 Ibid.  
138 Borza employed the use of Hammond’s chronology to formulate his own historical narrative. He accepts the 
identification of Orestes as the son of Archelaus, but mentions that the conclusion is based on conjecture rather 
than fact. 
139 The identification of Aeropus as the king’s uncle is circumstantial at best. 
140 King 2017, p.52 
141 Diodorus Library 14.37.6 Hammond leaves the end of Orestes’ reign ambiguous, stating that “whether he was 
killed or died is uncertain.” 
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the Spartans passage through Macedonia for their Asian campaign against the Persian Empire.142 
He would also support the Corinthian revolt against Spartan hegemony by supplying the rebels 
with military support. Unfortunately, Aeropus was outwitted by the Spartans, and was forced to 
reach terms favourable to the southern Greek power.143 From the limited analysis of these two 
events one can conclude that Aeropus held a vested interest in the limitation of Spartan authority 
in northern Greece. To achieve these ends he openly opposed the Spartan general Agesilaus, 
whose presence in the region signified a Spartan desire to control the politics and resources of 
the area. These efforts while ultimately unsuccessful, represent an attempt by the Macedonian 
kings to exert greater control over their own sphere of geographical influence. Aeropus would 
meet his end not by violence but by disease as he died of heart failure in the year 394 BC.144 
Aeropus likely intended for his son Pausanias to succeed him.145 This did not initially come to pass 
as Amyntas II would ascend to the throne of Macedonia following the death of Aeropus. 
Aristotle, in his list of the deposed tyrants of Greece146 introduced Amyntas by his better 
known title: “the little.” Amyntas II is an enigmatic figure with an uncertain origin. Hammond 
attests that Amyntas’ association with the royal house was by marriage. Archelaus, having a 
young heir in the form of Orestes, offered the hand of his daughter to Amyntas II. By doing so he 
hoped to prevent any future amphimetric disputes between the two parties.147 He also hoped to 
bring Amyntas over to his side.148 Therefore, the introduction of Amyntas II into the royal 
succession can be viewed as a side effect of Archelaus’ efforts to streamline the transfer of royal 
authority in the case of his death. Amyntas’ inclusion in Aelian’s gallery of disreputable royals 
must also be addressed, as it opens up the possibility of Amyntas’ ascension being the result of 
less than reputable means. Aelian’s description of the future Macedonian king involved the 
identification of Amyntas as the slave and attendant of Aeropus. He is later said to have betrayed 
                                                          
142 Borza 1990, p.178  
143 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.3-8 
144 Diodorus Siculus Library 14.84.6 Hammond believed he died shortly after his treaty was signed with Sparta. “He 
was outwitted by the Agesilaus a month or two before the eclipse of the sun.” See Hammond 1979, p.168 
145 King 2017, p.53 
146 See Aristotle Politics 13IIb 3-15 
147 Amyntas is identified as the least likely to engage in a dispute with the young Aeropus, on the basis of his marriage 
ties. See Hammond 1979, p.169  
148 Hammond mentions that Amyntas II was as old as or older than Archelaus. 
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this trust by acting against the interests of Aeropus.149 A few observations can be gleamed from 
a reading of this source. First, one can conclude that Amyntas II served as the royal page of 
Aeropus during his youth and later years. The second and more interesting observation involves 
the potential for Amyntas to use such a position to harm the king.150 Amyntas’ role as page 
explained his portrayal but not his inclusion in the royal succession. This oversight was clarified 
by Hammond who linked the figure of Amyntas II to Menelaus, the royal bastard occasionally 
identified in the sources as the brother of Alexander I.151 Amyntas II would only rule Macedonia 
for a few months, as he met his end shortly after his ascension to the throne. The scholarly 
consensus concerning the end of Amyntas II’s reign highlights the assassination of the 
Macedonian monarch at the hands of his royal page, a man by the name of Derdas.152 Ironically, 
it is through his hubristic interaction with Derdas that Amyntas earned his nickname, though 
scholars have speculated that the title was in fact a historical misnomer.153 Amyntas’ 
assassination represents a crime of passion, an impulsive attack made by Derdas in response to 
the humiliation he received at the hands of Amyntas II. As such, the murder of Amyntas the Little 
differs from the aforementioned murder of Archelaus as it lacked the complexity of a wide 
reaching court conspiracy. Regardless, Amyntas’ death must be viewed as a historical catalyst, as 
his murder initiated another scramble for the vacant throne by the remaining royal claimants. 
Control of the kingdom would pass from the family of Amyntas II to the son of Aeropus, a man 
named Pausanias.154 Little is known concerning the brief reign of Pausanias, beyond his ancestry 
and representation in royal coinage. Pausanias’ coinage followed a similar style, standard, and 
decoration to the productions of Archelaus and Aeropus.  An extant example of such a standard 
                                                          
149 Aelian Varia Historia 12.43 
150 The negative portrayal of Amyntas raises more questions than answers for the prospective scholar. Future 
analysis of this source must be undertaken to ascertain the validity of Aelian’s description. 
151 Justin 7.4.3 Justin would later confuse the figure of Amyntas II with Amyntas III who was descended from an 
Arrhidaeus, not Menelaus, a distinction which would identify the Macedonian monarch as part of an entirely unique 
branch of the royal line of Alexander I. 
152 Hammond 1979, p.170 
153 King 2017, p.53 Derdas was mocked by Amyntas II for his age. Therefore, the attribution of the nickname “the 
little” to Amyntas, while possibly symbolic in its meaning; as it identified the lesser nature of Amyntas’ royal 
pedigree/qualities is likely incorrect. If the identification of Amyntas II as the little is based on this reason it is a 
nickname meant to teach a moralistic lesson to the kings who followed, not a nickname based on a historical event 
as King states. 
154 The decision to recognize the claim of Pausanias over that of Philip is identified by Hammond as the decision of 
the Macedonian assembly. 
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involved the production of silver didrachms decorated with the emblem of a young man who was 
seen wearing a band in his hair. The scene is complemented by the portrayal of an unattended 
horse who is pictured walking to the right.155 Pausanias expanded upon the general template of 
royal imagery used during this period. This innovation is witnessed through the expansion of the 
images associated with royal emblems, namely through the portrayal of different animals which 
included but were not limited to: a running bear and a springing lion.156 Similar to the volatile 
administrations of his predecessors, the rule of Pausanias was short in duration and violent in its 
conclusion. Amyntas III, the centerpiece of this historical analysis, would seize the throne of 
Macedonia by force, killing Pausanias and assuming his royal title. The scholarly interpretation of 
Amyntas’ ascension is generally negative, with the usually neutral Diodorus greeting the 
ascension of Amyntas III with an adverse note: ‘Pausanias, the king of the Macedones, was 
disposed of by Amyntas by a trick’.157 In contrast, the Roman historian Justin is said to have 
favoured Amyntas III.158 This contrast in the opinion of the contemporary source material likely 
results from the bias of the source itself.159 Regardless, the stabilizing effect of Amyntas’ 
ascension cannot be denied, as the action brought an end to the Macedonian interregnum.160 
The dynastic struggles which characterized the six year period of 399-393 BC were 
contested mainly by representatives of the lines of Perdiccas and Menelaus.161 Both lines were 
descended from the founding figure of Alexander I, the Macedonian king who ruled first as the 
vassal of Persia, then as the king of an independent Balkan kingdom. At the time of Archelaus’ 
murder two of Macedonia’s royal lines had already disappeared from the historical record. 
                                                          
155 Hammond 1979, p.170 The youth pictured in such standards likely represented the king, while the horse 
represented his martial prowess. 
156 The image of the springing lion is shared with the royal productions of Aeropus. The images likely portrayed the 
typical practice of the royal hunt later seen in frescoes detailing the tombs of the ancient Macedonian kings. Amyntas 
III would adopt a similar style, though he would focus his emblems on the strengthening of the mythical link between 
the Argead royal house and the figure of Heracles.  
157 Diodorus Siculus Library 14.89.2 
158 Hammond 1979, p.171 The issue with Justin’s account stems from his confusion of Amyntas II and Amyntas III. 
159 Ibid. Additional hostile comments, provided by Aelian, are the result of the use of Theopompus, a Greek writer 
identified by Hammond as critical of any and all branches of the Macedonian royal house.   
160 An interregnum is a period of discontinuity or "gap" in a government, organization, or social order. This term 
perfectly encapsulates the anarchy of the period immediately following the death of Archelaus as the weakness of 
royal authority resulted in the absence of social order within the confines of the Macedonian court. 
161 Perdiccas and Menelaus were the sons of the Macedonian king Alexander I.  
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Alcetas, the brother of Alexander I, is said to have been killed by Archelaus upon his ascension to 
the throne of Macedonia.162 The bias of Plato against the figure of Archelaus is evident in his 
portrayal of the short lived Macedonian monarch. Commenting on the conversations of Socrates, 
Plato infers into the nature of Archelaus, labelling the character of the king as wicked, an 
assumption formulated on the basis that he held no claim to the throne which he currently 
occupied.163 In an act of deception, Archelaus is said to have invited his uncle to Aegae, under 
the pretense that he was to restore him to the kingdom Perdiccas had unlawfully usurped.164 The 
king would murder both of his rivals,165 an act which was predicated on the cementing of 
Archelaus’ position as unopposed ruler of the Macedonian kingdom. The credibility of this 
account is questionable at best, with the overt bias of Plato seeped into every description of 
Archelaus’ actions. Unfortunately, no other source detailing the transition of power from 
Perdiccas to Archelaus exists. This gap in the historical chronology is likely a result of poor 
preservation, as the sources which detailed the period no longer exist. While it is certainly 
possible that the source functions as little more than overt slander, it is equally likely that the 
biased account holds some truth to it. Regicide was witnessed to be quite common during the 
transition of power, as seen through the violent ends of many Macedonian kings.166 Therefore, 
one can safely assume that Alcetas did die in the intervening period between Perdiccas’ death 
and Archelaus’ ascension, a fate determined by the all-encompassing nature of the new king’s 
consolidation efforts. The second line of the Macedonian royal house that of Philip, was wiped 
out by the combined efforts of Perdiccas II and Sitacles the Odryssian king of Thrace. The 
reasoning behind the undertaking of such a dishonourable action is similar to the case of Alcetas, 
as the stability of the new administration was prioritised over familial ties of loyalty. 
                                                          
162 See Plato Gorgias 471 
163 This assessment of Archelaus represents an ad hoc attack on Archelaus’ right to rule, a baseless accusation meant 
to delegitimize the current monarch in favour of his royal rival. 
164 Plato’s narrative betrays his bias. By identifying the throne as rightfully belonging to Alcetas over Perdiccas, he 
demonstrates his support for the exiled kin of the previous monarch. This intrinsic bias against the entire line of 
Perdiccas is evident throughout the passage. 
165 Plato details the murder as such: “Archelaus after entertaining him and his son Alexander—his own cousin, about 
the same age as himself—and making them drunk, he packed them into a carriage, drove them away by night, and 
murdered and made away with them both.” 
166 During the six years which followed Archelaus’ assassination a total of three kings were murdered in three years. 
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The elimination of the primary representatives of the lines of Perdiccas and Menelaus 
facilitated the rise of another royal clan, that of Amyntas. Founded by a son of Alexander I also 
named Amyntas, this branch of the royal family came to power through the usurpation of 
Pausanias. Amyntas’ rule was not universally accepted by his contemporaries, as seen through 
his negative portrayal in the extant source material. While initially puzzling, the negative 
association of Amyntas III is understood as the result of scholarly bias, a bias which is evident 
when one identifies the possible source of Diodorus’ list, Marsyas of Macedon167 Hammond 
states that Marsyas held sympathies for the house of Perdiccas, a political leaning which is 
evident in his handling of the Macedonian king lists. This can first be seen through the order of 
the kings outlined by Diodorus. Archelaus is mentioned first in the line of succession, followed by 
Orestes, Aeropus, and finally Pausanias.168 The treatment of each king is equally as cordial, with 
the intrinsic bias of the sources for the Perdiccan line evident through their reinterpretation of 
historical events.169 This recognition of source bias is not meant to discredit the work of Diodorus. 
Instead, it is meant to highlight the conclusion all good historians must eventually reach; that no 
piece of history is perfect. 
Having established a rudimentary chronology of the period it is now vital to determine 
the intricacies of the Macedonian succession, as a study of the institutional function can aid in 
the comprehension of the kingdom’s volatility, an instability manifested throughout the period 
leading up to the ascension of Amyntas III.  
The study of the royal succession has produced two separate schools of scholarly thought. 
They differ on the role of the assembly in the succession process, with one group championing 
the constitutional authority of the assembly. Scholars who follow this school of thought attribute 
the selection of the monarch to an elective process: one in which the members of the 
Macedonian assembly deliberated and designated a royal successor.  This belief is challenged by 
                                                          
167 Hammond 1979, p.170-171 Hammond states that the source of Diodorus’ translation is possibly a man named 
Marsyas of Macedon. He is more famously referred to by his contemporaries as Marsyas of Pella.  
168 Amyntas II is omitted altogether from the king lists provided by Diodorus Siculus. This is likely a political slight 
aimed at their royal rivals in the house of Menelaus. 
169 Ibid. See note 166.  “Archelaus was killed accidentally. Aeropus was regent before he deposed of Orestes and 
became king. Aeropus died of illness and his son Pausanias succeeded him.” See Diodorus Siculus Library 14.37.6/ 
14.84,6 for a full translation of the king list.  
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a second group, who view the succession process as devoid of any constitutional procedure. 
Scholars who follow this school of thought view the selection of the heir apparent as the king’s 
prerogative, with the assembly limited to a ceremonial role.170 Both of these avenues of 
investigation carry merit in the ultimate understanding of the royal succession. As such, sources 
representing both perspectives will be consulted to achieve a historical consensus. 
Hammond views the various aspects of the Macedonian succession as a conservative set 
of principles which guided the assembly in its elective process. Control of the throne of 
Macedonia was to be limited to males of the Temenid house.171 In ideal conditions, royal 
authority was to be passed from father to son.172 In the event that the chosen successor was a 
minor, a regent was selected from the extended family of the heir apparent. This is witnessed 
during the reign of the Macedonian king Orestes, who ruled through the regency of his uncle 
Aeropus. The succession was an informal process which lacked a legal structure.173 Instead, the 
designation of an heir was left to the ruling of the Macedonian assembly. The practice of 
polygamy was encouraged under this constitutional process as the selection of the heir designate 
would be made from a pool of potentially qualified sons, rather than a single heir who may have 
held less than desired qualities for leadership. Unfortunately, the practice also acted as a double 
edged sword as the presence of multiple heirs encouraged inter dynastic dispute.174 Hammond 
contextualized the violence of the period following the death of Archelaus as the consequence 
of the assembly’s deliberations. The election of Orestes is one such mistake, as his age limited his 
effectiveness as a ruler. The assembly would correct this mistake through the election of Aeropus 
just two years after. The decision to elect a member of the line of Menelaus is also based on the 
deliberation of the assembly, a preventative measure meant to limit the possibility of 
                                                          
170 The king would present the heir apparent to the Macedonian court. The aristocracy would subsequently affirm 
the decision of the sitting monarch. As such the process is limited to a hereditary designation of authority. 
171 Hammond 1989, p.75 Hammond supports his position by the consultation of Curtius’ History of Alexander 10.7.15 
and Herodotus Histories 8.139. 
172 This inheritance format resembles the medieval primogeniture model. Hammond states that the transfer of 
power from father to son was one based on the belief that divine favour passed via patrilineal descent. Since the 
king was the people’s representative in conversations with the divine, such a favour was needed.  
173 Hammond contrasts this with the Spartan succession process seen in Herodotus Histories 6.51 and 7.3.3 
174 Hammond 1989, p.76 
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amphimetric strife between the lines of Aeropus and Orestes.175 This selection did not produce a 
stable transition of power, and the assembly was forced to revert back to the line of Perdiccas 
through the election of Aeropus’ son, Pausanias. Following Pausanias’ death the assembly 
selected the line of Amyntas to the throne of Macedonia. Contrary to the volatility of his 
predecessors, Amyntas’ rule was internally sound. The achievement of internal stability would 
ensure the continuation of assembly support for the house of Amyntas. This would result in the 
election of kings from this line until the extinction of the male line with the death of Alexander 
IV. 
The proliferation of disappointed pretenders was viewed by Hammond as an inevitable 
side effect of the royal practice of polygamy. This dilemma, coupled with the assembly’s erratic 
selection process, fermented a state of affairs in which rival claimants openly supported rebellion 
against the sitting administration. Therefore, it can be assumed that the assembly foresaw the 
potential for mass unrest in the case of limited royal authority. To counteract such sentiments 
the assembly was said to have passed a law which specifically dealt with treason against royal 
authority.176 The accused would be brought before the assembly, which met under arms. The 
trial would be prosecuted by the king himself with the defendant afforded the legal right to speak 
and call witnesses. The verdict would be handed down by the assembly who acted as a 
jurisdictional authority in such matters. If the defendant was found guilty he was put to death, 
often immediately following the assembly’s verdict.177 The extended family of the accused would 
suffer a similar fate, a decision which explains the subsequent disappearance of the families of 
Philip and Alcetas following the revelation of their treasonous culpability by the Macedonian 
assembly.178 Such a draconian measure may seem excessive when viewed in a modern context. 
                                                          
175 The assembly was said to have foreseen trouble between the brothers of Orestes and Aeropus if either was 
elected. 
176 Hammond 1989, p.76 
177 The assembly would use spears or stones in the killing of the guilty party, a decision which according to Hammond, 
resulted in a slower and more painful death. Examples provided by Hammond include the trials of Parmenion’s son 
Philotas by Alexander and Alexander’s mother Olympias by Cassander. 
178 For the custom of the Macedonian’s involving the execution of entire family line’s in cases of royal treason see 
Curtius History of Alexander 8.6.28 and 8.18.18. 
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However, the alternative was no less violent as the unopposed formation of court intrigues 
allowed for amphimetric strife on an unprecedented scale. 
The notion of a constitutionally powerful assembly as the ultimate authority in the 
determining of royal succession is first challenged by the work of R.M Errington. Relying on 
Antigonid rather than Temenid evidence for his assertion, Errington argued that a “consensus of 
the nobility” determined the Macedonian succession.179 This is seen through the selection of 
Alexander III. Immediately following the death of his father Philip II, Alexander is said to have 
been acclaimed as king of the Macedonians by the hetairoi.180 These Macedonian aristocrats 
likely performed such an action with the understanding that their support would be rewarded 
through positions of political authority. Greenwalt rightfully discredits the identification of the 
nobility as the sole determiners of royal authority, as the proclamation of Alexander III merely 
represents the first of many emergency protocols to be followed in a time of dynastic upheaval. 
Alexander had already been recognized as heir apparent through his administrative and military 
capabilities.181 Therefore, his rise to the position was a mere formality. The opportunistic jostling 
for royal favour can be credited to the setting of the Philip’s assassination.182 This does not mean 
one should discount the effect noble support held in the securing of royal authority. Instead, one 
should view the influence of the nobility as one of the many factors which went into the selection 
of the heir to the throne of Macedonia. 
 Miltiades Hatzopoulos argued for an entirely different method of royal succession.  He 
believed that the first son born to a king following his ascension was recognized as the heir to the 
throne. If the son was underage when the father died a regent was selected, often from the 
immediate family of the deceased king. The arrangement was temporary, as the young prince 
would assume the royal title at the age of maturity.183  This method of royal succession, identified 
                                                          
179 Greenwalt 1989, p.19 For a full account of Errington’s position see R.M Errington’s The Nature of the Macedonian 
State Under the Monarchy 1978, p. 99 
180 Specifically mentioned are Alexander the Lyncestrian and Antipater. 
181 Alexander III had served on the cavalry wing of Philip’s army at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. 
182 A public show of support in front of Macedonia’s elite would likely secure one’s position as an integral player in 
the function of the upcoming royal administration. 
183 See Hatzopoulos 1986 p.280 section f 
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by the term porphyrogennetos184 is a plausible explanation for the seemingly unorthodox nature 
of the Macedonian succession process. For example, one can argue that the young Orestes was 
selected over his elder brothers purely on the basis of his status as porphyrogennetos.185 
Therefore, Hatzopoulos’ stance on the succession debate is to be viewed as a recognition of a 
hereditary based primogeniture, which was modified on the timing of the king’s ascension. 
Selene Psoma counters the argument of Hatzopoulos, which she identifies as problematic in 
nature due to its similarities in structure to the traditions of the Spartan dual monarchy.186 She 
argued that the succession model of the Macedonians could not mirror the Spartan tradition as 
the Macedonian kingdom lacked the institutions required to make such a model work.187 Also, a 
dearth of evidence concerning the age of the Macedonian kings at their succession makes the 
feasibility of such a model problematic at best. Regardless, the recognition of a modified 
primogeniture seems plausible and should not be discounted in the final creation of a theoretical 
model of Macedonian succession. 
The conception of the theory concerning royal legitimacy as a determining factor in the 
succession is not one to be discounted, as the accusation of illegitimacy is witnessed throughout 
the history of the Macedonian kingdom. This holds especially true to the figure of Amyntas III 
who was slandered by later historians who accused him of being born of the “bastard line” of 
Menelaus. For the interest of this investigation, the question of royal legitimacy will be limited to 
the ascension of Archelaus, as his questionable origin led to the lambasting of his character in 
Plato’s Gorgias, one of the few sources which can be credibly identified as contemporary to the 
period. For the purpose of this particular observation of Archelaus’ royal credibility, it will be 
assumed that Plato’s description, while excessive, holds some truth. The incorporation of the 
                                                          
184 Psoma 2013, p.79 
185 Orestes was the eldest son born after Archelaus ascension? Such a situation would force the selection of Orestes 
over a more competent elder relative. 
186 Psoma quotes the work of Herodotus for the identification of this form of royal succession. See Herodotus 
Histories 7.3 for an explanation of porphyrogennetos. 
187 Psoma mentions the separation of the heirs from Spartan society as the difference between Spartan and 
Macedonian princes. In Sparta, the royal princes of the dual monarchy were raised separate from all walks of Spartan 
life. This isolation included royal exemption from participation in the agoge, the Spartan training regimen required 
for all youths. Such a practice was not employed in the upbringing of the Macedonian elite, who are seen to have 
accompanied the heir as his companions (hetairoi). See Psoma 2013, p. 79 
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idea of legitimacy to the study of the Temenid succession is especially interesting if one considers 
the place of Archelaus in the royal succession. If Archelaus was the eldest son of Perdiccas II,188 
the issue of age would not limit his qualifications as he would succeed under the royal practice 
of father to son primogeniture. This revelation is what makes the actions of Archelaus especially 
dubious as it can be understood that his dishonourable intent to eliminate his competitors likely 
stemmed from an internal recognition of his own inferiority.189 Therefore, the attack by Plato on 
Archelaus’ credentials is rightly focused on the lesser status of his mother, a ranking which limited 
his appeal as a potential successor to his father Perdiccas. 
 A polygamous king would have possessed many wives and many lovers. This polygamous 
arrangement served a constitutional purpose, as it provided the king with a pool of potential 
royal candidates. The practice of ranking the various wives of the Macedonian king is witnessed 
in history190 with the son of the “primary wife” often singled out for royal recognition as the heir 
of the sitting king. Archelaus’ murder of Alcetas and the young son of Perdiccas II, can be 
identified as the actions of a royal pretender, an unrecognized son who was passed over in favour 
of the more legitimate offspring of Perdiccas II. The removal of Alcetas also hinted at the nature 
of royal regency, as the underage son of Perdiccas would require supervision until he came of 
age. The responsibility of such a position would be tasked to the eldest member of the royal 
bloodline, who in this case would have been the aforementioned Alcetas. Therefore, the actions 
of Archelaus can be understood as the desperate attempt of a royal pretender to wrangle control 
of the kingdom from the more reputable members of the Macedonian court. That this had to 
happen at all only reinforced the importance of legitimacy to the selection of a royal successor.191 
                                                          
188 King 2017, p.50 King references the fragments of a treaty signed in the 420’s BC between king Perdiccas II and 
Athens. In this treaty the name of Alcetas appears after the king, a position which signified his superior standing over 
Archelaus in the royal succession.   
189 Plato identifies the unnamed seven year old son of Perdiccas as the legitimate heir to the throne of Macedonia. 
As the eldest son, he held precedent over Archelaus, whose status as the son of Perdiccas’ slave Simiche placed him 
lower in the royal succession despite his age. 
190 In the case of Amyntas III, the primary wife was Eurydice as her three sons: Alexander II, Perdiccas III, and Philip 
II ruled as kings of Macedonia. 
191 Ogden shares this conclusion, stating that “the issue of polygamy itself is closely associated with that of 
legitimacy” He differs from many by labelling the status of royal wives as relatively equal except in the case of the 
royal succession. Finally, Ogden identifies the issues of serial monogamy and set royal successions by labelling them 
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The final and most influential factor in the selection of a royal heir involved the choice of 
the king himself. William Greenwalt shares this assessment, stating that “if the king was 
popular,192 then he was in the position to indicate his heir and expect to have his choice accepted 
by the most powerful of the Macedonian elite following his death.”193 The power of the 
Macedonian king is also recognized by the notoriously critical Demosthenes, who identifies the 
king’s unquestioned position as the kingdom’s greatest institutional advantage over the 
democracy of Athens.194 The designation of royal recognition is seen in the surviving treaties 
between Macedonia and its various neighbours. On these treaties the position of one’s name in 
relation to that of the king identified one’s position in the royal succession. Amyntas III himself is 
seen to have designated his eldest son Alexander as the heir designate through his inclusion in a 
treaty with Athens.195 Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the opinion of the king carried 
great weight in the selection of the royal heir. 
Through an analysis of the aforementioned theories concerning royal succession one can 
conclude that the truth lies in a combination of various historical perspectives. The royal 
succession is a patrilineal based system where the authority of royal power is passed from father 
to son. This process is informal, with little base in constitutional frameworks. The notion of one’s 
legitimacy affects one’s standing, though the full effect of one’s legitimacy is marred by the 
misunderstanding of polygamous hierarchies.196 Finally, the decision of the king is absolute, with 
the role of the assembly limited to a ceremonial recognition of the king’s previously made 
                                                          
as historical fallacies. I.e. The notion of bastardry is linked to the preconceived notion of certain wives as illegitimate. 
For a full description of bastardry disputes and amphimetric strife see Ogden Polygamy Prostitutes and Death. 
192 Greenwalt states that a king’s authority stemmed from his ability to effectively manage the multiple apparatus’ 
of the Macedonian administration. His success in doing so granted him leeway in the selection of a preferred heir. 
Therefore, hereditary selection takes precedent over constitutional procedure in the selecting of a royal heir.  
193 Greenwalt 1989, p.35 
194 Demosthenes Olynthiac 1.4-5 Demosthenes likely meant to contrast the effectiveness of autocratic rule in 
facilitating decision making with the monotonous briefings of the Athenian assembly, which often resulted in 
bureaucratic stalemates and political posturing. 
195 Psoma 2013, p.85 
196 Mainly through how the mother was ranked in relation to political importance and diplomatic usefulness. 
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designation. Therefore, the royal succession is to be understood as a form of hereditary based 


















                                                          
197 This understanding of the royal succession is based on normal political arrangements. In times of crisis, a less 
organized manner was employed in the selection of royal authority. It is during these uncertain times that violence 
can be used to assert one’s claim. 
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Chapter 4 Part 1: Amyntas’ Macedonian Background: A Discussion of His Family 
 
 Amyntas III’s Macedonian origin is quite unclear for the inquisitive scholar. This historical 
gap is a by-product of the dearth of evidence from this period concerning the parentage of 
Amyntas, a situation which has resulted in the questioning of Amyntas’ legitimacy.198 Due to the 
lack of contemporary evidence, later historians have resorted to the use of conjecture in their 
chronologies of the period. This decision has helped to an extent in the crafting of historical 
narratives. However, the incomplete nature of the historical narrative leaves the identification of 
the parentage of Amyntas III up to the opinion of the modern historian. 
 Diodorus Siculus identifies Amyntas III as the son of Arrhidaeus.199 The opinion of 
Diodorus is substantiated by an inscription which labels the king as the son of Arrhidaeus.200 If 
Diodorus’ assessment is to be believed, then one can conclude that Amyntas’ father was not a 
king.201 Since royal authority derived from patrilineal descent, this meant that Amyntas III’s 
grandfather was a king of Macedonia. The figure in question is identified by Ogden as Amyntas, 
the fifth son of Alexander I.202 Amyntas’ absence from the records of Herodotus and Thucydides 
marks him a relative historical unknown as little is understood regarding his provenance beyond 
his name and association. However, one can understand Amyntas’ anonymity if one accepts his 
role as the non-political son of Alexander I, a position which allowed for the survival and eventual 
ascension of his line to the throne of Macedonia following the removal of the line of Perdiccas 
and the extinction of the lines of Alcetas, Philip, and Menelaus.203 This analysis of Amyntas’ 
ancestral origin is countered by the position of Justin, who identifies the king as the son of 
Menelaus.204 The linking of the line of Amyntas to the personage of Menelaus is quoted by Daniel 
                                                          
198 Carney 2019, p.17 
199 Diodorus Siculus Library 15.60.3 
200 See SIG (Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum) 135,137 
201 No Arrhidaeus appears in any of the established king lists provided by ancient historians. 
202 Ogden 1999, p.7 
203  In essence, Amyntas’ lack of political ambition saved his dynasty, as Perdiccas did not view him as a threat, an 
association which led to the removal of the line of his brother Philip, who had briefly ruled jointly with him and 
Alcetas following the death of Alexander I. Amyntas’ decision to not challenge his brother Perdiccas is interpreted 
by Daniel Ogden as a show of loyalty and an act of self-preservation.  
204 Justin 7.4.3 
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Ogden, who identifies Menelaus as one of the brothers of Perdiccas II.205  However, it is important 
to note that while Ogden agreed with the translation of Justin, he disagreed with the slanderous 
insults of Aelian, who identified Menelaus as the bastard son of Alexander I.206 The reasoning of 
Ogden seems sound as the association of Amyntas III with the figure of the disreputable 
Menelaus arose from the machinations of his royal rivals, who aimed to slander his credibility 
through a reinterpretation of his ancestry.207 
 The identification of Amyntas III’s family is fairly straightforward, with each of the king’s 
family members being mentioned in the source material. Amyntas III is said to have had two 
wives, named Eurydice and Gygaea respectively. The association of Amyntas III with the practice 
of polygamy stems from his multiple marriages. It also represents the first historical evidence of 
polygamy amongst the Macedonian kings, a practice previously believed to have been founded 
during the reign of Amyntas’ son Philip II. Whether or not these marriages overlapped is up to 
opinion, as no clear historical consensus has been reached concerning the topic. It is the opinion 
of the writer that such an arrangement occurred simultaneously.208 It is through the translations 
of Justin that the children of Amyntas are identified.209 By Eurydice, Amyntas would have three 
sons who would reach the throne: Alexander II, Perdiccas III, and Philip II. From Gygaea, he had 
a further three sons named Archelaus, Menelaus, and Arrhidaeus respectively. It is possible that 
Amyntas married Gygaea first as Eurydice was apparently ensconced at the end of Amyntas’ 
reign.210 However, while this reasoning is sound, it relies too heavily on the assumption that 
Macedonian kings practiced serial monogamy, a belief which could not be farther from the truth.  
There is little to no evidence concerning the provenance of Gygaea. Ogden’s vague attempt to 
satisfy both sides of the historical debate comes across as problematic with his analysis resulting 
in the creation of more questions than answers. This is witnessed when he argues for the 
                                                          
205 Ogden 1999, p.6 
206 See Aelian Varia Historia 12.43 Aelian uses the term nothos to describe Menelaus. 
207 The link between Amyntas III and Menelaus was likely put forward during the brief rule of the usurper Argaeus. 
See Carney 2019, p.18  
208 The marriage of two women at once would secure the greatest number of potential heirs for the royal succession. 
209 Justin 7.4 
210 Ogden 1999, p.11 Ogden utilized the term ensconced to identify Eurydice’s placement in a secure place. This 
refers to the establishment of Eurydice as the primary wife of Amyntas, a status reflected in the ascension of 
Eurydice’s sons over the sons of Gygaea. 
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identification of the name as traditional while simultaneously mentioning the practice of 
renaming amongst the Macedonian elite.211 Eurydice, by contrast is a major historical player. 
Identified as the daughter of Sirrhas, the question of her origin has been the subject of historical 
debate throughout the centuries.212 Two ideological camps concerning Eurydice’s ancestry have 
developed in the scholarly community. The first group shares the opinion of Plutarch, who viewed 
the wife of Amyntas III as the daughter of an Illyrian chieftain.213 This position is countered by 
scholars who identify Eurydice as the daughter of an Upper Macedonian elite.214 The latter 
position seems the most plausible historically. This conclusion is formulated on the basis of 
Sirrhas’ association with the Lyncestid prince Arrhabaeus.215 No consensus has yet been reached 
concerning the kingdom Sirrhas would have hailed from though a few have been provided. These 
include but are not limited to the Upper Macedonian kingdoms of: Elimeia, Orestis, and 
Lyncestis.216 The association with Lyncestis seems the most viable choice as it would identify 
Sirrhas as an appropriately close associate of the prince. Therefore, Eurydice’s origin is 
Macedonian, with her marriage to Amyntas III acting as a guarantor of support from the kingdoms 






                                                          
211 The reality of Gygaea trends towards her origin as a Macedonian noblewoman. It is unlikely she changed her 
name as the source material would have mentioned such a development. 
212 Who was Sirrhas? Aristotle is discouragingly vague in his description, while later historians like Plutarch identify 
Sirrhas as Illyrian. 
213 Plutarch Moralia 14b Plutarch states that she was Illyrian and barbarian three times over. 
214 Ogden 1999, p.13 
215 See Aristotle Politics 5. 13.11b 
216 Ogden 1999, p.12 
217 It would foster the necessary relations needed for a united defence of the realm in the case of hostile tribal 
incursions. This also establishes the marriage as taking place after the Illyrian invasion of 393 BC. 
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Chapter 4 Part 2: Amyntas’ Ascension and the Illyrian Invasion of 393 BC 
 
 Amyntas’ murder of Pausanias in 393 BC represented the latest seizure of royal authority 
in what had been a deeply tumultuous period of civil unrest for the country. His ascension 
coincided with the reorganization of the tribes of Illyria under the leadership of the Dardanii king 
Bardylis.218 His control of the tribes is to be viewed in a purely militaristic sense as the Illyrians 
were not a set nation, but rather a collection of tribes.219 The Illyrians had engaged in frontier 
skirmishes with the kings of Macedon since the sixth century BC.220 These intermittent raids on 
the Macedonian frontiers represent one of the few concrete sources of information available to 
modern scholars concerning the period before the rule of Alexander I.221 Illyrian raids would 
continue to plague the frontiers of the kingdom throughout the history of ancient Macedonia, 
with the tribes occasionally able to influence the politics of the region.222  
 The Illyrian incursion into the domain of Amyntas III does not represent an extension of 
Greek politics.223  Rather, it is to be viewed as a border dispute, initiated by the Illyrians for the 
sole purpose of securing the wealth of the Macedonian kings. Ancient source material concerning 
the events of this raid are limited to the historical fragments of Diodorus Siculus and Isocrates. 
Diodorus describes the raid as having taken place shortly after the ascension of Amyntas III.224 
The invasion is overwhelmingly successful for the Illyrians, as they are able to defeat the armies 
                                                          
218 Hammond, Griffith 1979, p.172 
219 Borza 1990, p.180 Borza identifies the misinformed perspectives of Greeks and Romans as the main contributing 
factor towards the grouping of the Illyrians as a unified nation.  
220 See Justin 7.2.5-13 
221  The historian Justin highlights an occasion in which the infant king Aeropus was moved to the front following a 
Macedonian defeat at the hands of Illyrian tribesmen. See Harry James Dell “The Illyrian Frontier to 229 BC” for a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the Macedonian kingdom and the Illyrian tribes. 
222 Illyrian raiders had aided the cause of the Upper Macedonian king Arrhabaeus against the forces of Perdiccas II 
and the Spartan general Brasidas. CJ King reaffirms this statement, mentioning the conflict in relation to the latter 
border constructions made by Perdiccas; successor Archelaus. 
223 Borza contrasts the honouring of an established alliance by the tribes during the war against Perdiccas II, with the 
sudden venture of the Dardanii king Bardylis.  
224 The concurrent timing of Amyntas III’s ascension and Bardylis’ invasion have led some scholars to speculate that 
the raid was a reaction to the instability caused by Pausanias’ assassination. While intriguing, such a conclusion 
cannot be proven due to the lack of supporting evidence for such an assertion. It is more likely that the raid was 
planned as part of a greater venture laid out by Bardylis who had been consolidating the strength of the Illyrians 
since the year 400 BC.   
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of Macedonia, occupy the kingdom, and drive Amyntas into exile in Thessaly.225 The portrayal of 
Amyntas as a weak monarch fleeing his kingdom is contested by Isocrates in his account of the 
Illyrian invasion. In Isocrates’ version, Amyntas III is similarly defeated in a pitched battle against 
the forces of the Dardanii king Bardylis. The account diverges from the interpretation of Diodorus 
by having Amyntas initially contemplate exile but eventually decide against such a course of 
action.226 As a result, he is said to have established his base of operations in a small fortified 
position in the country. The location is not mentioned by Isocrates but one can safely assume 
that Amyntas’ stronghold resided in the ancestral capital of the Macedonian kingdom, Aegae.227 
Inspired by the miraculous recovery of King Dionysus228 in Sicily, Amyntas is said to have 
conducted his own reconquest with the aid of Macedonian loyalists. In a reversal of fortune which 
goes against all logic, Amyntas is restored to Macedonia in a mere three months. 
 Through a quick comparison of Isocrates’ position with that of Diodorus, it becomes 
readily apparent that the two historians held irreconcilable differences of opinion concerning the 
character of Amyntas III. Isocrates presented the king as a tenacious individual who refused to 
give up. His unbreakable resolve to hold fast in the face of overwhelming adversity, namely 
through his continued defence against Illyrian occupation, is demonstrated by his establishment 
of a stronghold at Aegae. In contrast, Diodorus Siculus presented the king as a realist, one who 
entered exile willingly in the hope of eventually gathering the necessary support abroad to retake 
his throne. Diodorus’ presentation of Amyntas’ actions following his army’s defeat at the hands 
of Bardylis’ raiders seems the more plausible of the two historical perspectives. Isocrates’ belief 
that Amyntas lost the entirety of his kingdom and subsequently regained it in a period of three 
months represents an illogical overestimation of Macedon’s depleted military capabilities. The 
size of the Illyrian occupation force229 would have necessitated the usage of a professional 
                                                          
225 Diodorus Siculus Library 14.92.3-4 
226 Isocrates Speeches 6.46  
227 The capital would serve as Amyntas’ base of operation during the latter Olynthian occupation of 383 BC. The 
terrain was easier to defend then Pella on the basis of its geographical position. Also, it is unclear whether or not 
Pella was used as the full time residence of the king. Therefore, an established retreat could continue as the base of 
Macedonian resistance against Illyrian occupation. 
228 Isocrates refers to Dionysus of Syracuse, the Greek tyrant who engaged in a prolonged conflict with Carthage, to 
mixed success. 
229 Which likely outnumbered the standing armies of ancient Greece 2:1 
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standing army or the aid of a powerful Greek ally to expel.  Unfortunately for Amyntas, he found 
himself wanting in both departments.230 This discrepancy in military standing made Amyntas’ 
situation untenable, a reality which would have logically resulted in the king’s flight from 
Macedonia. Therefore, the narrative of Diodorus is to be viewed as the more plausible of the two 
accounts, as it’s characterization of Amyntas represents the motivations of a king who based his 
actions in reality. This does not mean that the account of Isocrates is false, as the description of 
the Illyrian invasion provided by Isocrates mirrors the events of an entirely separate invasion 
altogether.231 Consequently, the linking of the events of 393 BC with the interpretation of 
Isocrates should be viewed as a mistake by modern chroniclers who formed an unfounded 
connection between the two on the basis of pure speculation, rather than historical fact. 
 Which part of Greece did Amyntas flee to during his exile? What actions did he take to 
procure foreign support for his royal restoration? These questions summarize the historical 
discourse surrounding Amyntas’ exile. A relative consensus has been reached on the location of 
Amyntas’ person during his time away from Macedonia. It can be safely assumed that Amyntas 
turned to Macedonia’s historical allies, the Aleuadae of Larissa, for support against the 
Illyrians.232 The lands of this aristocratic family also served as the exile of Amyntas III during the 
Illyrian occupation. He is also said to have approached the Chalcidice league with an offer of 
territory in Macedonia’s eastern environs in exchange for military support against the Illyrians.233 
This arrangement would never come to pass as it would eventually be the Aleudae who restored 
Amyntas III to the throne of Macedonia following a two year interregnum. 
                                                          
230 His son Philip II would develop the professional army of Macedonia. The Greek powers were engaged in conflicts 
throughout the peninsula, depriving Amyntas of any foreign support. 
231 Isocrates’ description of the Illyrian invasion of 393 BC mirrors the events of 383 BC, where Diodorus mentions a 
Macedonian defeat at the hands of an Illyrian army which is in turn followed by the Olynthian occupation of the 
majority of the country. The repetition of such an event is to be viewed as a historical doublet, a convenient Segway 
provided by Diodorus to explain the rapid collapse of Macedonia’s fortunes.  
232 Borza 1990, p.182 Borza identified the Aleudae of Larissa as an aristocratic faction of Thessaly led by Medius who 
controlled a sizable portion of the Thessalian plain. See Hammond 1979, p.172-173 for the evidence concerning 
Medius. 
233 It is debated whether or not the gift of land constituted ownership or usage. The later war between Macedonia 
and Olynthus over the access to Macedonia’s resources leads one to side with the latter interpretation. A further 
discussion of the ramifications of such a choice will be discussed in the final chapter of the thesis, which details 
Amyntas’ relationship with Olynthus.  
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 Due to the uncertainty of the source material, it is difficult to ascertain the status of the 
Macedonian throne during Amyntas’ two year exile. The non-political nature of the Illyrian raid 
on Macedonia suggests that Bardylis did not assert direct authority over the territories he briefly 
occupied following Amyntas’ defeat.234 As a result of this observation one can safely rule out the 
possibility of direct Illyrian control over the kingdom of Macedonia. It also compromises the 
arguments of those who propose the installment of a puppet king during this two year period.235 
The basis of this historical argument is found in the translations provided by Diodorus.236 The 
total lack of contradictory evidence has led to a scholarly adoption of Diodorus’ narrative as 
historical fact. Unfortunately for these historians, the contradictory nature of the available 
sources on Argaeus undermines their arguments for his potential usurpation of power. The first 
disagreement lies in the ancestry of Argaeus. Islami identifies Argaeus as a Lyncestian elite set up 
on the throne by the Illyrians.237 This position is contrasted by Hammond who argues for Argaeus 
to be recognized as a son of king Archelaus.238 Ironically, Hammond undermined his own 
historical assessment through his identification of the constitutional role of the assembly in the 
ousting of Amyntas III from the throne.239 The second scholarly disagreement exists in the dating 
of Argaeus’ kingship. The position of Diodorus and Isocrates is challenged by Ellis, who associates 
the rule of Argaeus with Olynthus’s occupation of the majority of Macedonia in 385 BC.240 While 
Ellis’ argument is plausible, it lacks the required evidence needed to substantiate such a 
contradictory assertion. Therefore, Argaeus’ short-lived kingship, if it is indeed a historical reality, 
should be dated to the two year period of Amyntas’ exile from the kingdom, as the chronological 
                                                          
234 Borza 1990, p.182 Borza identifies Bardylis’ raid as one based on the procurement of loot. 
235 See Islami Les Illyriens, p.57-58, Hammond 1979, p.172, for arguments regarding Argaeus’ potential rule over the 
kingdom of Macedonia. 
236 Diodorus Siculus Library 14.92.3-4 Diodorus seems equally uncertain of Argaeus’ kingship as he prefaces his 
translation with the phrase “some say”. 
237 His elevation would have coincided with a recognition of Illyrian economic interests in the territory of Argaeus’ 
kingdom. In essence, Argaeus ruled as a puppet king to facilitate the seizure of Macedonian resources. Thus the 
arrangement represent a mutually profitable endeavour. (Amyntas gains the throne/ The Illyrians can control 
Macedonia indirectly through a monarch friendly to their economic interests).  
238 See Hammond 1979, p.172 
239 Hammond 1979, p.175 Hammond would state that Argaeus was elected to the position after the assembly voted 
to remove Amyntas from power. His indecisive analysis questions the validity of both assessments. 
240 See Ellis Amyntas III, p.5-8 Ellis identifies Argaeus as the puppet king of Olynthus. The occupation of Macedonia 
makes such an argument an attractive historical possibility. 
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placement is substantiated by a reputable ancient source in Diodorus Siculus, and an established 
scholarly figure in N.G.L Hammond.  
 The following conclusions can be drawn from the scholarly debate surrounding Argaeus. 
First, it is unlikely that the ascension of Argaeus was sponsored by the Illyrians, as the move would 
have deviated from the historical trend of conducting their raids on the attainment of riches. 
Second, the nature of the evidence concerning Argaeus is slim and circumstantial at best. The 
lack of a historical consensus inhibited the efforts of well-intentioned historians who found their 
interpretations irreconcilable with the opinions of their contemporaries. As a result, it is the 
opinion of the author that Borza is correct in his analysis of the scholarly debate concerning 
Argaeus.241 Prudence indeed demands that we recognize the intrinsic shortcomings of the source 
material. Scholars do not know who Argaeus is, if he ruled, or when he ruled. Any conclusions on 
the subject of such a mysterious figure will be wracked by inconsistencies borne from conjecture.  
Therefore, any and all associations of Argaeus with the rule of Amyntas III should be viewed as a 
historical possibility but not a certainty, an inference made by Diodorus to explain the situation 
of the Macedonian throne during the two year exile of Amyntas III in Thessaly.  
 The Illyrian invasion represents the first substantial challenge to the rule of Amyntas III in 
Macedonia. The incursion of Bardylis and the subsequent destruction of the Macedonian army 
creates a situation which is politically untenable for the beleaguered Macedonian monarch. His 
defeat is not a product of his own deficiencies as a leader. Instead, it should be viewed as the 
culmination of a series of events beyond Amyntas’ control.242 The transfer of land rights to 
Olynthus represents the desperate action of a defeated leader, who plays his diplomatic hand in 
the hope of foreign intervention. The manipulative and often subservient relationship Amyntas 
held with Olynthus would continue throughout his reign and would eventually result in war a 
mere six years after his restoration. Regardless, Amyntas is to be credited for his suave diplomatic 
acumen as he is able to: secure the support of Macedonia’s traditional allies, expel the 
                                                          
241 Borza 1990, p.182 
242 The army of Macedonia was miniscule and unprofessional in its training and structure. When faced with the 
numerically superior forces of Bardylis, defeat was all but a certainty. 
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occupation of the Illyrian raiders, and secure internal stability in his kingdom.243 This diplomatic 
flexibility, a callback to the policy of his predecessor Perdiccas II, would be vital to Amyntas’ 
survival over the coming years as he attempted to tackle the precarious challenge of aiming to 
solidify Macedonia’s waning royal authority while contending with the expansionist policies of 
















                                                          
243 Following Amyntas’ restoration in 391 BC he would rule Macedonia uninterrupted for another twenty one years. 
This represents a reprieve from the chaotic reigns of his royal predecessors. 
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Chapter 5: Amyntas III and Olynthus 
 
 The complex decade long relationship which existed between Amyntas III and the 
Olynthian led Chalcidian league commenced at the outset of his reign. Following his army’s defeat 
in battle by the Illyrian forces of the Dardanii king Bardylis, Amyntas is said to have made 
diplomatic overtures to the various powers of Ancient Greece with the aim of gaining support in 
the expulsion of his kingdom’s occupiers.  The aforementioned Aleudae of Larissa would 
eventually honour their traditional friendship with the Macedonian kings, first by hosting the 
exiled Macedonian monarch, then by expelling the Illyrians and restoring Amyntas to the 
throne.244 The Macedonian appeal to the Aleudae, while ingenious in retrospect, does not 
represent Amyntas’ only diplomatic maneuver following his military defeat in 393 BC. This second 
overture is represented by Amyntas’ offering of land to Olynthus.245 The granting of any land by 
Amyntas is to be understood in the context of land usage, not land ownership.246 Therefore, one 
can conclude that Amyntas III offered the usage of his economically valuable land as a bargaining 
tool in the creation of a potential military alliance. The proposed alliance never materialized and 
the land offered by Amyntas was returned to him following his restoration to the Macedonian 
throne in 391 BC. The return to the pre-war status quo was not to last,247 as Amyntas’ gift had 
informed Olynthus of the value of his eastern territories. 
 To comprehend the complex nature of the relationship between Amyntas III and Olynthus 
one must first establish a rudimentary understanding of the region itself. The general consensus 
concerning the origin of Chalcidians is provided by Michael Zahrnt who links the founding of 
Olynthus to the actions of colonists from Colchis, who arrived in the region in the earliest part of 
                                                          
244 See Chapter 4 Part 2: Amyntas’ Ascension and the Illyrian Invasion of 393 BC for a description of the Aleudae of 
Larissa and their role in restoring Amyntas III to his throne in Macedonia. 
245  See Borza 1990, p.182, Hammond, Griffith 1979, p.172. Hammond states that in desperation Amyntas granted 
Olynthus the territory “close at hand”. This would have correlated with the area around Lete and Lake Bolbe. Borza 
proposed the granting of land located in the Volvi-Koroneia Lake corridor. The offering of land as a bargaining device 
is not unique to Amyntas III as the area represents land previously granted to Olynthus by Perdiccas II in 432 BC.    
246 The Chalcidicans could use the land and exploit its strategic resources. It could not station colonists or troops in 
its area. Therefore, the land is an economic opportunity offered in exchange for immediate military aid.  
247 Hammond 1989, p.79 Hammond describes the relationship between Macedonia and Olynthus as neutral and 
uninvolved as each state was preoccupied with the expansionist tendencies of Athens and Sparta.  
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the 8th century BC.248 The first literary reference to the region would appear in the geographical 
treatise of Hekataios of Miletos, where he identified the various cities which existed in close 
proximity to the coast. This initial assessment would be expanded upon by the historian 
Herodotus, who identified the region as one of the many stops made by the Persian navy during 
their invasion of Greece.249 At this point in history the people of the northern peninsula were 
viewed by the southern Greeks as one people, an opinion exemplified by Herodotus’ 
identification of a Chalkidikōn genos in the list of levied troops raised by the Persians from the 
occupied cities of the peninsula.250 However, the identification of such a political union is suspect 
at best as the Athenian chroniclers, the primary source for the period, ignore such a development 
completely. As such, it is likely that Herodotus’ terminology served as an allusion to a common 
origin, not an ethno-political entity.251 The proposed unity of the Chalcidians would devolve in 
the period following the Persian conquest with the Athenian tribute lists labelling the cities of 
the region as independent entities. At this point the city of Sermylia252 is viewed as the premier 
power of the region, as its economic prosperity marks it as one of the more lucrative sources of 
tribute for the Athenians. Olynthus, by comparison, is relatively lacking in its economic 
contribution to the league.253  
 The consolidation of the Chalcidian state under Olynthus’ authority commenced during 
the events of the Peloponnesian War. Athens’s establishment of a settlement at Amphipolis in 
437 BC coincided with the raising of tribute and the establishment of new tributaries within the 
Chalcidice peninsula. The agitation felt by the Chalcidians towards Athens would prove beneficial 
to the designs of the Macedonian king Perdiccas II.254 Perdiccas lent legitimacy to the northern 
independence movement by rallying the Potidaeans and Bottiaians against the tyranny of 
                                                          
248 Beck, Funke, 2015, p.341 See their chapter on The Chalkidike and the Chalcidicans for a full analysis of the 
historical debate concerning the origin of the Greeks in this region. 
249 Herodotus Histories 7.122-123  
250 Herodotus Histories 8.127  
251 Beck, Funke, 2015, p.343 
252 Sermylia was located to the east of Olynthus and Torone. It dominated the southern tip of the Sithonia.  
253  Zahrnt states that Olynthus contributed a consistent tribute of two talents to the league. This established it as a 
middling power. 
254 Beck, Funke, 2015, p.344 Perdiccas felt slighted by Athens’s support for his internal enemies. This indignation 
likely refers to the support Athens provided for Perdiccas’ brother Philip. 
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Athenian hegemony.255  United by Perdiccas’ machinations and driven by the dream of 
independence, the cities of the region defected from the league in 432 BC.256 Perdiccas is then 
said to have convinced the Chalcidicans to abandon their coastal cities in favour of Olynthus.257 
Consequently, Olynthus would rise to become the leading power of a unified Chalcidian 
ethnos.258  United by a common cause, Olynthus would persevere in the face of great adversity. 
It would emerge from the peace of Nikias relatively intact,259 a status which allowed it to claim 
the mantle of Chalcidice’s chief representative. Olynthus would continue to resist Athens over 
the coming years, siding with her enemies while overcoming Athenian attempts at reconquest.260 
The final action attributed to Olynthus before the ascension of Amyntas III involved its 
membership in the anti-Spartan coalition of 395 BC, a move which likely ingratiated the ascending 
state with the beleaguered Macedonian monarchy. Devoid of alternatives and desperate for aid 
Amyntas granted Olynthus access to his land bordering the league,261 a move made under the 
assumption that Olynthus would be better suited to combat the Illyrian threat.  
 In 391 BC262 Amyntas III established a treaty which regulated the relations between the 
two neighbouring states.  Discovered in the ruins of Olynthus, the treaty263 established a 
defensive alliance between the two powers, one which was meant to last for the duration of 
Amyntas’ reign.264 The treaty favored Olynthus’ economic interests as it permitted the 
                                                          
255 Zahrnt credits Perdiccas for the revolt, as he identifies the kings’ rallying of Sparta and Corinth as central to the 
outbreak of war in Greece. 
256 The sending of an Athenian fleet to restore the cities to tributary status would serve as the main catalyst of the 
Peloponnesian war.  
257  Olynthus was to serve as the stronghold for Chalcidian resistance against Athens. Perdiccas would encourage this 
relocation by providing any and all emigrants with access to Mygdonia for the duration of the war. 
258 The unified Chalcidican state can be viewed as a federal state with Olynthus at its head or a unified state based 
at Olynthus. The former interpretation is preferable as it identifies the Chalcidian people as equals within a federal 
state represented by Olynthus. 
259 See Thucydides 5.18.5-8 for the Athenian perspective on the peace. The treaty dismembered the burgeoning 
Chacidican state, returning the majority of Sithonia to Athenian control.  
260 Beck, Funke, 2015, p.349 The persistence of Olynthus is presented by the words of the Athenian general Nikias, 
who derided Athens’s decision to sail to Sicily while they left the Thracian Chalcidians unconquered.  
261 Roisman, Worthington, 2010, p.159 Roisman believes that the land given by Amyntas was in the area of 
Mygdonia. 
262 Rhodes, Osbourne 2004, p.56-57. Rhodes and Osbourne leave the dating of the stele up to personal  
interpretation (390-380’s BC) The earlier date for the treaty seems the more logical choice, as it would identify the 
treaty as a document concerned with the establishment of Macedonia’s internal stability and external friendships. 
263 See Chapter 2 for an epigraphic analysis of the Macedon-Olynthus treaty. 
264 The terms of the treaty detail an agreement meant to last fifty years.  
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unrestricted import of ship building timbers, a resource critical to the construction of any ancient 
fleet. The terms of the treaty also acquiesced to Amyntas’ diplomatic demands as Olynthus was 
prohibited from engaging in diplomacy with states favourable to its interests.265 The phrasing of 
this treaty established a temporary understanding between the two states. Macedon would 
submit to Olynthian economic demands in return for a guarantee of military support in any future 
conflict. This allowed Amyntas a much needed reprieve, which he used to strengthen the 
weakness of central authority.266 Therefore, the treaty is beneficial in the short term, as it secured 
Macedonia’s borders while opening trade with an amicable neighbour. Unfortunately for 
Amyntas, the treaty inadvertently facilitated the funding of Olynthus’ economic and political 
expansion. In the event of war with Olynthus, Macedon would be faced with an ambitious foe 
strengthened by the resources of his own kingdom. The aftereffects of such a foolhardy decision 
were not immediately felt, and the peace between the two held for a time. Regrettably, relations 
between the two states would sour, resulting in a war that would push Macedonia to the brink 
of annexation. 
In 383 BC Amyntas requested the return of the land granted to Olynthus in the treaty of 
391 BC.267 Olynthus denied Amyntas’ request,268 using the slight as a prerequisite for war against 
the Macedonian kingdom. Olynthus’ refusal was justified, as the strength of the Chalcidian league 
dwarfed that of Amyntas’ Macedon. It had attracted further members to its league, extended its 
territory to the Macedonian frontier of Anthemus,269 and forced the Bottiaeans from their coastal 
cities into the hinterland.270 Olynthus would embark on a campaign to “liberate” the cities of 
                                                          
265 The peoples of Amphipolis, the Bottiaeans, Acanthus, and Mende were diplomatically isolated in the terms of the 
Macedonian-Chalcidican treaty. The prevention of friendships between Chalcidice and these states was meant to 
inhibit Olynthus’ encroachment into Macedonia’s sphere of influence.   
266 Amyntas was successful on this front. Internal dissent from the rival families of Perdiccas and Menelaus ceased, 
ending a period of internal strife which had plagued Macedonia for a decade. 
267 Hammond states that such a request came after the expulsion of a second Illyrian invasion in 385 BC. See 
Hammond 1989, p.176. This assessment is an example of Diodorus’ historical doublet and should be disregarded. 
Instead, the request should be viewed as a decision made by Amyntas III following eight years in which he spent 
restoring the strength of the Macedonian throne. 
268  See Diodorus Siculus Library 15.19.2 Diodorus employs the problematic use of a doublet, in which he 
contextualizes Amyntas’ demand as the response to another panicked gift of land following another Illyrian invasion. 
The invasion in question did take place. However, it took place in Epirus to install the puppet king Alcetas.  
269 The amalgamation of nearby cities into the Olynthian state is called sympoliteia. 
270 Hammond 1989, p.80. The unfettered access to Macedon’s strategic resources had disrupted the balance of 
power, forging Olynthus into a power which could eventually rival that of Athens or Sparta. 
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Macedonia, advancing as far as Pella, which it would hold for the remainder of the war.271 The 
initial success of the Olynthian campaign can be credited to the disparity in each state’s military 
potential. The military arm of the Chalcidian league, commanded by Olynthus, was said to have 
been composed of 800 cavalry, 8000 heavy infantry, and many lightly armed peltasts.272 In 
contrast, Amyntas is said to have possessed a comparatively miniscule force.273 Amyntas would 
flee Pella but not his kingdom, establishing his stronghold at the ancestral capital of Aegae. He 
would regress to the policy of Perdiccas II, when he called on the Spartans for aid against the 
invading Chacidians.274  In 382 BC, the Spartans sent an advanced force of 10000 men under the 
leadership of Teleutias to aid Amyntas’ plight. Following his capture of Potidaea, Teleutias was 
said to have instructed Amyntas to “hire mercenaries, and give money to the nearby kings in the 
hope of gaining their alliance.”275 Teleutias’ alliance would be made complete through his 
recruitment of Derdas, king of the Elimea.276 The allied force would secure some initial victories 
over the Chalcidian league,277 pushing all the way to the gates of Olynthus. The Chalcidians would 
stem the advance of the Spartans in a pitched battle. During this battle, the peltasts of Teleutias 
were routed by the Chalcidican cavalry. This maneuver left the Spartan phalanx exposed to the 
missiles of the wall, which resulted in the destruction of the Spartan expeditionary force.278  
Nevertheless, the city’s resistance was crumbling and Olynthus would capitulate to a second 
                                                          
271 Xenophon Hellenica Graecia 5.2.13 
272 Hammond 1989, p.80 
273 See Diodorus Siculus Library 15.19.3. See Borza 1990, p.185. Borza believes that Amyntas may not have possessed 
a national levy. Therefore, his “personal force” is to be understood as the combined force of the royal guard and 
assembled mercenaries. 
274 See Xenophon Hellenica Graecia 5.2.11-20 for the appeals of Apollonia and Acanthus. Xenophon’s account credits 
the work of the Acanthian envoy Cleigenes for the intervention of Sparta. Cleigenes presented the victorious 
Olynthus as a potential ally of the Athenians and Thebans. This situation was intolerable for Sparta. In contrast, 
Amyntas’ Macedon represented a neutral, nonthreatening alternative, one that could aid Sparta against future 
barbarian incursions in the region.  
275 Hammond 1979, p.177 Hammond quotes the work of Xenophon Hellenica Graecia 5.2.38. Hammond believes 
that Teleutias thought little of Amyntas’ military potential. The command likely concerned the employment of 
Thracian mercenaries and the acquisition of the armies of Upper Macedonia. 
276 See Xenophon ibid. Teleutias acquired the aid of Derdas by exposing the danger his lesser realm faced if Olynthus 
conquered Macedonia. Derdas would personally lead an allied cavalry squadron during the war. 
277 Hammond attributes the success of the army to the cavalry of Derdas. See Hammond 1979, p.177 Derdas’ cavalry 
were fully armed and well mounted, and they had been trained to manoeuvre and fight in close formation, an 
advantage which allowed them to inflict heavy losses on the Olynthian force. See Xenophon Hellenica Graecia 5.2.42 
and 5.3.1. 
278 See Xenophon Hellenica Graecia 5.3.3-6 and Diodorus Siculus Library 15.21.2-3. 
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Spartan force led by the king Agesipolis in 379 BC.279 The terms imposed upon the defeated 
Olynthus were severe. The Chalcidian league was dissolved and forced to submit to Spartan 
hegemony.280  
The terms of Olynthus’ surrender favoured Spartan interests as they expanded her 
influence into the northern cities of the Greek peninsula. While Amyntas may have been initially 
discouraged by the encroachment of Spartan influence, he no doubt rejoiced at the destruction 
of his most formidable adversary. Amyntas recovered his lost territories, along with the lands 
granted in the treaty of 391 BC.281 These acquisitions would be permanent and Amyntas’ borders 
would never be threatened again for the remainder of his reign. Even if Sparta demanded 
subservience in all matters of foreign policy282, it was a small price to pay, as Amyntas effectively 
secured the integrity of his kingdom’s borders for little cost. This arrangement was not to last, as 
Amyntas would shift allegiance to Athens soon after the defeat of Olynthus. The liberation of 
Thebes and the formation of a grand alliance led by Athens signalled a change in the fortunes of 
Sparta, who effectively descended to the position of secondary power as a result.283 Therefore, 
Amyntas’ decision is to be viewed as a logical adaptation of the policies of his predecessors, a 






                                                          
279 See Hammond 1979, p.178 The Spartan king would supplement the expeditionary force’s depleted numbers with 
the aid of Thessalian cavalry recruited for the campaign. 
280 Borza 1990, p.186 Borza also states that the control of Olynthus’ foreign policy had been granted to Sparta. Borza 
quotes the descriptions of Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus. See Xenophon Hellenica Graecia 5.3.26 and Diodorus 
Siculus Library 15.23.3 
281 Hammond identifies this land as the borderland of the Anthemus. 
282 See Hammond 1979, p.178 
283 Hammond 1979, p.178 
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Chapter 6: Amyntas’ Relationship with Athens and the Final Years of His Reign  
 
 The reorientation of Amyntas’ foreign policy from Sparta to Athens is identified through 
the remains of a treaty signed between the two powers. Scholarly opinion concerning the 
provenance of the treaty is divided between those who associate the treaty with the Athenian 
expedition of Chabrias in 375 BC, and those who favour an association with the expedition of 
Timotheus, which took place in 373 BC.284 The extant fragments of the treaty, which were 
discovered in association with a stele at Athens,285 praised the efforts of Macedonia’s envoys. 
They record the oaths taken by Amyntas III and his son Alexander II, who would have been 18 at 
the time of the treaty’s ratification.286 The association of his name in relation to that of his royal 
father signalled him out as Amyntas’ chosen successor, a recognition likely made to streamline 
the future succession of the Macedonian kingdom.287 The economic terms of the treaty, which 
do not survive in the extant source material, are likely concerned with the establishment of trade 
relations between the two states, with Athens afforded preferable rates for the import of 
Macedonian timber.288 In return, Amyntas would receive a powerful ally to deter foreign 
incursions into his kingdom. Therefore, the treaty is to be understood as a mutual understanding 
between two amicable powers.289  However, the treaty is not an instantaneous agreement 
                                                          
284 For a translation of the treaty fragments see M. N. Tod. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. Vol. ii: From 
403 to 323 B.C. Inscription 129. 
285 Hammond 1979, p.178 Hammond states that Geyer preferred the earlier provenance associated with Chabrias. I 
tend to mirror this assessment as the treaty seems to differ from the latter agreement reached between Timotheus 
and Amyntas over the funding of Timotheus’ private enterprises.  
286 Hammond states that Alexander would have likely been 18 at the time of the treaty as he was the eldest son of 
Eurydice, whom he married in 393 BC. 
287 Amyntas’ designation of a chosen heir correlates with the succession pattern established in chapter three. By 
identifying a chosen successor he hoped to prevent the amphimetric strife typically associated with the royal 
transition. 
288 Amyntas’ Macedon would have provided access to Macedonian timber in a similar fashion to the treaty 
established with the Chalcidians in 391 BC. This meant that Macedon would become the primary supplier of timber 
for the newly established Athenian league. See Psoma 2014, p.138 
289 Hammond does not believe that the treaty signified Macedon’s entrance into the Second Athenian League as 
the wording of the oaths establish the treaty as an alliance between Athens and Amyntas, not Athens and her 
allies and Amyntas. See Hammond 1979, p.178 This conclusion seems logical as the wording of the treaty signifies 
an agreement between diplomatic equals. For an understanding of the friendship between Macedonia and Athens 
at this time see Aeschines Speeches 2.26 and 2.28 
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devoid of context. Instead, it represents the accord of two powers with similar interests.290 For 
Athens this involved the expansion of her influence.291 For Amyntas it involved the opening of 
new commercial avenues to prevent a monopolization of Macedonia’s strategic resources. 
Finally, it was beneficial for Amyntas to ally Athens as the Chaclcidian cities were hostile to the 
influence of both powers, a factor which necessitated a pact of mutual defence against potential 
Olynthian aggression.292 While the treaty did not represent Macedon’s entrance into the Second 
Athenian League,293 it ultimately strengthened it, as Macedonian timber contributed to the 
rebuilding of Athens’ maritime and merchant navy.294 
 The sale of Macedonian timber was not limited to official imports by the Athenian state. 
This is proven by Amyntas’ gift of timber to the Athenian general Timotheus.295 This private 
backing of an individual commercial interest was the king’s prerogative as he held full control 
over this particular strategic resource. 
 Diodorus Siculus states that in 374 BC Amyntas III established an alliance with Jason of 
Pherae, the powerful tyrant who ruled over the entirety of the Thessalian plain.296  In theory, 
Jason’s usurpation of the Aleuadae of Larissa’s aristocratic rule would have resulted in war with 
Macedonia. Amyntas did not pursue this course of action as the unified army of the Thessalian 
league dwarfed that of the Macedonian king.297 In an act of self-preservation Amyntas would 
abandon his Thessalian allies by seeking an accord with Jason. This action is typical to the 
survivalist nature of the king, who would do anything to protect the integrity of his kingdom.  
                                                          
290 Athens had established a Second Athenian League, while Amyntas had established a semblance of internal and 
external stability within the kingdom. 
291 Diodorus Siculus Library 15.47.2-4 Diodorus mentions that Timotheus had convinced many Thracian cities to 
join their alliance. 
292 Hammond 1979, p.178 
293 For a discussion of the Second Athenian League see Cagrill’s study aptly titled The Second Athenian League 
294 Borza 1990, p.187 Borza quotes Xenophon 6.1.11 where he mentions that the Athenians were dependant on 
Macedonian timber during the 370’s BC. 
295 The timber granted to Timotheus was for his own personal naval enterprises. Demosthenes 49.26-30 states that 
the wood was sent from Macedonia to Timotheus’ house in Piraeus. 
296 See Diodorus Siculus Library 15.60.2 Jason of Pherae had subjugated the Aleuadae of Larissa, the aristocratic 
allies of the Macedonian kings.  
297 See R.A Gabriel’s Philip II of Macedonia: Greater than Alexander p.199 Gabriel outlines the army of Jason as 
follows: 8000 cavalry, 20000 hoplite mercenaries.  
Klein 70 
 
 The final act of Amyntas’ reign involved his participation in the King’s Peace in the year 
371 BC.298 Amyntas’ delegate was said to have “exercised a vote in his own right”, a quote which 
identified Macedon as an independent power free to pursue its own ends at the peace talks. The 
delegate was said to have voted to return Amphipolis to Athens, an action which contradicted 
Macedonian interests as it afforded the Athenians unobstructed access to Macedon’s valuable 
timber supply.  Amyntas’ decision to follow the general vote of the Greeks lends credence to the 
theory proposed by Hammond, who identified Macedon as a useful ally invited by Athens to 
secure her interests.299 Amyntas’ dependence on Athens for military protection likely made such 
an arrangement possible. Amyntas would not live to see the arrangement come into effect as he 
died the following year, leaving his kingdom to his son Alexander II.300  
 Amyntas’ relationship with Athens is founded on the sharing of mutual enemies and 
mutual interests. Amyntas is dependent on Athens’ military for the protection of his realm. 
Athens is dependent on Amyntas for the construction of her fleet. Therefore, Amyntas’ 








                                                          
298 See Aeschines Speeches 2.32 Amyntas is said to have been entitled to a seat, a peculiar concession as none of the 
Greek powers had recognized Macedonia as Greek. 
299Hammond 1979, p.179 Borza expands on Hammond’s assessment by attributing the action as typical for the 
Macedonian kings as it represented an action taken from a position of weakness with no long range significance. See 
Borza 1990, p.188 
300 Hammond states that Amyntas died of old age in the latter part of 370 BC. See Hammond 1979, p.179 For the 





 Amyntas III’s rule over the kingdom of Macedonia represents the quintessential study in 
stately survival. The death of Archelaus in 399 BC and the following anarchy weakened the 
authority of the Macedonian state. This weakness would facilitate an overt challenge to 
Amyntas’ rule through the figure of Argaeus. Unfortunately for Amyntas, this internal turmoil 
coincided with pressure from Illyrian raiders and an ambitious Olynthus.  
 Amyntas’ rule was dominated by foreign attacks and occupations. The survival of his 
kingdom in the face of such adversity is a credit to Amyntas’ diplomatic acumen. Macedonia 
suffered greatly during this period as the countryside was devastated by incessant warfare. The 
full extent of the destruction during this period is unknown. It represents an intriguing avenue 
of future research once the excavations at Pella determine the extent of the war’s effect. The 
army of the Macedonian king, credited by Thucydides during the reign of Archelaus, was 
reduced to insignificance. Consequently, Amyntas reverted to the policies of Perdiccas II as he 
looked to Sparta and Athens for military support in the defence of his realm. Therefore, 
Amyntas’ dependent nature on the greater powers is not a sign of weakness. It is a logical move 
made in the face of overwhelming external pressure. 
 Amyntas’ Macedonia is a kingdom in flux, reeling from the trials and tribulations of his 
reign. One can easily observe that the realm Amyntas passed to his son Alexander II, was 
significantly weaker than the kingdom he inherited. However, one can also recognize the steps 
taken by Amyntas III to stabilize the internal structure of his kingdom. Ultimately, Amyntas III is 
to be viewed as a king who possessed remarkable courage, tenacity, and resilience. These traits 
would guide Macedonia during this troubling period, allowing it to emerge as the undisputed 
power in the Greek world during the reign of Amyntas’ son Philip II. 
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Silver stater of Amyntas III. Portrays his link to the mythical Heracles on the left and his 
association with Zeus on the right. 
